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INTRODUCTION

This article argues that criminal trial juries perform an impor
tant but inadequately appreciated social function. I suggest that
jury trials serve as a means through which we as a community take
responsibility for - own up to - inherently problematic judgments
regarding the blameworthiness or culpability of our fellow citizens.
This is distinct from saying that jury trials are a method of

making

judgments about culpability. They are that; but they are also a
means through which we confront our own agency in those judg* A ssi stant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1989, Towson S tate; J.D.
Harvard. - Ed. I would like t o thank Phoebe Ellsworth, Thomas Green, Samuel
Gross, Daniel Halberstam , and William Miller
1992,
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ments. The jury is an institution through which we as individuals
take a turn acknowledging and coming to terms with the difficult
things we as a community find it necessary to do.
I suggest that the jury's responsibility-taking role is important
primarily because of what it may be understood to say about who
we are as a community. My aim, therefore, is to examine one of the
ways in which the criminal trial jury may function as an expression
of community identity. I argue that the way in which we go about
performing certain difficult societal tasks says something about
what we stand for, what kind of people we are, and what sort of
community we want to be. I suggest that the passing of judgment
on our fellow citizens is just such a task. How we do it may be as
important to us as what we do. In particular, we may want to face
this difficult and defining task in a way that allows us to describe
ourselves as a forthright and courageous community - a com
munity willing to confront and acknowledge responsibility for its
judgments.
Conceptually, the argument operates at several levels of gener
ality. Most broadly, I suggest that meaning does matter. I argue
that the social meanings and expressive content of legal rules and
practices ought to be understood as primary goods. Alongside con
sequentialist arguments keyed to concerns such as efficiency and
deterrence - and alongside normative arguments rooted in princi
ples such as fairness, justice, and rights - lawyers need to find ways
of arguing about meaning. Because arguments about social mean
ing and expressive content are inevitably contextual and contingent,
the subject lends itself less to abstract theorizing than to concrete
illustration. Accordingly, although one of my claims is that lawyers
ought to be more willing to argue about social meaning as a primary
good in a wide range of contexts, the bulk of this article is ad
dressed more specifically to the criminal trial jury.

I hope to

demonstrate that expressive content can be argued about coher
ently, and that the criminal trial jury is an institution well suited to
this form of argument.
·More specifically still, I focus on just one of the myriad of po
tentially meaningful aspects of the criminal jury trial and on just
one of the many potential meanings which might be ascribed to that
aspect. The critical variable for purposes of this argument is the
extent to which the procedures governing the criminal jury trial
tend to engender in jurors a sense of personal responsibility for the
fate of the accused. The meaning I attempt to ascribe to that varia
ble is courage, or rather a particular quality of forthrightness and
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Courage

integrity for which courage is as good a label as any. I suggest that
we might admire those individuals and communities who are willing
to stand behind what they do. We might want to count ourselves
among those who confront, rather than evade responsibility for, the
difficult things which we as a society find it necessary to do. In
particular, we might consider it cowardly and base to construct a
system through which we could hold others responsible for their
actions - for that is what we do though the criminal justice system
- without any of us ever having to take responsibility for those
assignments of responsibility.
The structure of the argument is as follows: Part II describes
and defends my approach. I argue that the meaning of a criminal
trial jury may be as important as its consequences. I also defend the

claim that the social meaning of legal institutions, such as the jury,
is worth arguing about.1
Part ID briefly describes the jury's responsibility-taking role and
attempts to flesh out my claim regarding its potential expressive sig
nificance. I defer until Parts IV and V a discussion of precisely how
that role is manifested and how it is or might be enforced. Instead,
Part III addresses the more fundamental, and more difficult, ques
tion of why it might be seen as important to express, through the
device of jury responsibility, the form of courage I describe.
Part IV argues that recognizing the jury's responsibility-taking
function has explanatory power. Several otherwise puzzling facets
of the procedural and evidentiary structure governing the criminal
trial jury can be partially explained or illuminated by ascribing this
function to the jury. Specifically, I point to four aspects of jury trial
practice and procedure: the uncertain status of jury nullification,
persistent concerns that certain forms of evidence will "usurp the
role of the jury," the doctrine of

Caldwell

v.

Mississippi,2

invocation of "conscience" in prosecutorial argument.

and the
Each of

these contentious areas makes more sense if viewed through the
lens of jury responsibility, rather than solely through the lens of jury
decisionmaking.
1. Considerations of this sort, when acknowledged at all, are sometimes referred to as the
"expressive" or "symbolic" functions of law. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians'

Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic
Importance of Tort Reform, 23 GA. L. REv. 295 (1989); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483 (1993). These terms, however, seem
to me inadequate, insofar as they suggest a merely tertiary status for what I believe is a
critical, if often-ignored, aspect of law.
2. 472 U.S. 320 {1985).
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In Part V, I ground my argument in concrete recommendations.
In sum, jury decisionmaking in criminal cases ought to be struc
tured in such a way as to ensure that each juror understands, ac
knowledges, and confronts his or her agency in that jury's decision.
Several concrete measures appear capable of achieving this end
without unduly compromising the jury's ability to perform its more
generally recognized decisionmaking function. First, if juries are to
be the place where we take turns confronting and accepting individ
ual responsibility for what we have collectively decided to do, we
ought actually to take turns - all of us. We ought not be able to
put that obligation on the shoulders of some identifiable subset of
the community.

Second, consistent with overwhelming current

practice, unanimous verdicts ought to be required in criminal cases.
Third, contrary to current practice, juries ought to be informed as to
what punishment will be imposed in the event of a conviction.
My fourth and final recommendation is more tentative. Jurors
should be instructed in such a way as to encourage them to feel a
sense of agency in bringing about the consequences of their deci
sions. While this recommendation may appear on its face uncon
troversial, its implications are serious, and its application uncertain.
It amounts to a suggestion that juries should be made aware, albeit
indirectly, of their power to nullify, but without being encouraged
to use that power. I use the term "power" rather than "right"
because I do not advocate nullification. On the contrary, I argue
that jurors have a duty to bring in a conviction when the evidence
so warrants; and a refusal to do so represents a breach of that duty.
Nullification, on my view, is not a right that jurors ought to exer
cise, but rather a risk that we ought to bear.
II.

WKY ARGUE ABOUT
A.

THE

MEANING OF THE JURY?

The Meaning of the Criminal Trial Jury

The jury has been described and justified from a \vide range of
perspectives. So why muddy the theoretical waters with yet an
other justification?

In particular, why seek to articulate an ad

ditional role rooted in difficult-to-articulate and highly subjective
notions of courage or cowardice? Four reasons:
First, and most obvious, juries perform a range of roles which
need not be mutually exclusive. Debate over the evidentiary and
procedural rules and practices governing jury trials ought to be
informed by the fullest possible understanding of the societal role
played by those trials. Analysis of the jury should not, for the sake
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of simplicity or theoretical elegance, ignore significant functions
merely because they may be difficult to quantify. Imagine, for ex
ample, a family lawyer studying potential reform in child custody
law. He or she would recognize that families provide children with
food, shelter, and education - three good justifications for the
family as an institution. However, only the most narrow of
Gradgrind's intellectual descendants would ignore things like love,
companionship, and personal identity formation, merely because
they are hard to define with precision.
Second, recognizing the jury's responsibility-taking function
does not require setting aside more traditional explanations for the
jury. Nothing in this article is intended to deny that the jury's cen
tral and primary function, both doctrinally and in fact, is and ought
to be the fair and accurate resolution of disputed questions of fact.
It would be a mistake, however, to allow the regulation of the jury
trial, let alone its continued existence in various contexts, to turn
entirely on its efficacy as a factfinding device.
Among the many other functions assigned or attributed to the
jury are those keyed to political, rather than strictly judicial, con
cerns. At least since De Tocqueville pointed out the way in which
the jury in nineteenth-century America served as both a locus for
popular participation and a device for civic education,3 scholars
have debated the propriety and efficacy of the jury as a civic or
educational institution. These political or civic roles may be loosely
referred to as the communitarian function of the jury. For example,
it has been suggested that juries may help secure public acceptabil
ity of otherwise controversial outcomes,4 or provide a needed sense
of public catharsis.5 By one account, the criminal trial jury in par3. De Tocqueville opens his discussion of the jury by observing that "[i]t would be a very
narrow view to look upon the jury as a mere judicial institution; for however great its influ
ence may be upon the decisions of the courts, it is still greater on the destinies of society at
large." ALExls DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282 (Phillips Bradley ed. &
Henry Reeve & Francis Bowen trans., Alfred A. Knopf 8th ed. 1960) (1835).
4. See, e.g., HARRY KAI.VEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 7 (1966); Charles
Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98
HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1368 (1985) ("Many of the procedures of our legal system are best
understood as ways to promote public acceptance of verdicts.").
5. See, e.g., George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function ofthe Criminal Jury Trial and
the Rights of the Accused, 74 NEB. L. REv. 804, 809 (1994) (acknowledging that "the com
munitarian value of trial by jury results from its ability to induce a societal catharsis");
Charles R. Nesson & Michael J. Leotta, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Cross-Exam
ination, 85 GEO. LJ. 1627, 1688 (1997) ("The essence of this catharsis is a public airing of
grievances of charges and rebuttals from all parties."). Chief Justice Berger has referred to
the "therapeutic value of open justice," and has maintained that public jury trials provide "an
outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion." Richmond Newspapers Inc. v.
Vrrginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-571 (1980). But see Peter L. Arenella, Televising High Profile
Trials: Are We Better Off Pulling the Plug?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 879, 886 (1997) (argu-
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ticular is described as performing three sorts of communitarian
roles: "1) a vehicle for direct community participation in the crimi
nal justice system;

2)

a means by _which the community is educated

regarding the criminal justice system; and
faith

of

the

community

in

the

3)

a ritual by which the

administration

of justice

is

maintained."6
. The communitarian perspective on the jury is illuminating in
that it focuses attention upon the jury's role in the expression of
community identity.7 In general, however, these analyses have em
phasized the way in which the criminal law expresses community
identity or community mores through the substantive content of
rules and punishments.8 I suggest further that the very decision to
use juries to make decisions may itself be a significant expressive
act.
Third, the jury is an institution which seems to call for, and be
particularly suited to, the sort of social-meaning analysis I suggest
ing that there is "no empirical evidence supporting his contention that open trials actually
served this cleansing/purging function. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that a trial's public
nature will encourage appropriate co=unity catharsis when the public disagrees with the
jury's verdict.").

6. Harris, supra note 5, at 807-08 (acknowledging the importance of the co=unitarian
function of the criminal trial jury but arguing that this function should give way to the jury's
function of protecting the rights of the accused in those rare circumstances where the two
functions come into conflict).
7. Indeed, two co=entators have gone so far as to assert that "[i]t is now co=onplace
to assert that the jury performs an important ideological or symbolic role." Peter Duff &
Mark Fmdlay, Jury Reform: Of Myths and Moral Panics, 25 INTL. J. Soc. LAW 363, 363
(1997); see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED CoMMODITIES 173 (1996) ("Legal in
stitutions can express culture, or they can help shape it. Where legal institutions help shape
culture, they do so in part by instantiating and reinforcing particular conceptions of the na
ture of persons and their good."); Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of
Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 190, 192 (1990) (describing "a theory of jury
responsibility, in which the jury is conceptualized as a democratic representative of the com
_munity through its verdicts" and thus a body that should "convey the moral condemnation of
the co=unity in a criminal case and the range of viewpoints of the co=unity in a civil
case"); Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 60-61 (1994)
("The significance of adjudication also lies in defining public values.").
8. See, e.g., A.C. EWING, THE MoRALITY OF I'uNISHMENT WITII SoME SUGGESTIONS FOR
A GENERAL THEORY OF ETHICS (1970) (describing punishment as "a form of language");
R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME
& JuST. 1, 33 (1996) (describing punishment as "co=unication"); Joel Feinberg, The Ex
pressive Function of Punishment, in 4 PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
(Jules L. Coleman ed., 1994); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RE
TRIBUITVISM AND !TS CRITICS 1, 11-15 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992); Herbert Morris, A Paternal
istic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHrr.. Q. 263, 264-65 (1981). For a concise overview of
this literature, see Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEo. LJ. 775, 800-08 (1997). It is also arguable that
some work which does not use the language of expression might best be understood as hing
ing on the social meaning of certain punishments. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, What is
Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE LJ. 1055, 1059 (1998) (arguing that shame
sanctions amount to a form of "official lynch justice" involving "an ugly, and politically dan
gerous, complicity between the state and the crowd").

Courage
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in this article. The jury as an institution has a long and complex
history, and one which is closely tied to Anglo-American history
generally.9 It was not created by an Advisory Committee as a fo
cused response to some clearly identifiable set of consequentialist
concerns. Rather, it has evolved slowly, over time, and in ways inti
mately connected to the collective self-understandings of the com
munities it has served.10 Moreover, the jury has become a
distinctively if not yet uniquely American institution.11 Even
England, the historical source of our own heavy reliance on jury
decisionmaking, has reduced dramatically its use of the institu
tion.12 Yet we persevere. Despite persistent uncertainty over accu9. See JoHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES (1960) (describing the evolution of
legal decisionmaking and dispute resolution by those other than full-time professional
judges); WILLIAM FoRSYIH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (London, John W. Parker & Son
1852) (seminal study of the early English jury trial); THOMAS GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING
TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CruMiNAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800 (1985)
(describing the evolution of the criminal trial jury in England from the demise of the trial by
ordeal in 1215 to the beginning of the nineteenth century).
10. See DAWSON, supra note 9, at 1 (arguing that the structure of court systems through
out history, including "the alternative or competing means by which group decisions could be
made
are a product and a reflection of many forces in society at every stage in their
growth [and] also react on the societies that created them").
•

•

•

11. As both comparative law scholars and critics of the jury are quick to point out, the
jury is far from universal. Continental systems following the inquisitorial model of criminal
procedure make little or no use of juries. In France, for example, juries are used only in the
cour d'assisses, the jurisdiction of which is limited to crimes for which the sentence is five
years or more and which requires just a 213 majority verdict See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 113-14 (Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed., 1993); see
also CoMPARATIVE CruMINAL PROCEDURE 73-74 (John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996). Germany
does not use juries as we understand them but does employ lay decisionmakers in the form of
mixed courts consisting of citizens and judges. See CruMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra, at 141-42; see also CoMPARATIVE CruMINAL PROCEDURE,
supra, at 143; Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk: From
Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43 AM. J. CoMP. L. 227 (1995). See generally CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN EUROPE: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995). The Nether
lands does not use juries; nor does Luxembourg. Italy makes use of juries only at the appel
late level; and Portugal only in cases involving crimes punishable by more than eight years
imprisonment. See EC LEGAL SYSTEMS: AN INTRoDucroRY GUIDE (Maurice Sheridan &
James Cameron eds., 1992) (France-33; Germany-41; Netherlands-25; Luxembourg-28; Italy36; Portugal-26). It is worth noting, however, that both Spain and Russia have recently rein
troduced trial by jury in criminal cases. See GENNADY M. DANILENKO & WILLIAM BURN
HAM, LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 530-39 (1999); Stephen c.
Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by Jury, 21 HASTINGS INTI.. & CoMP. L. REv. 241 (1998).
Japan does not use juries. See Glenn Theodore Melchinger, For the Collective Benefit: Why
Japan's New Strict Product Liability Law Is "Strictly Business," 19 U. HAw. L. REv. 879, 913
n.207 (1997) ("Japan had a quick prewar 1923 experiment with jury trials for serious criminal
cases with the Baishinhou [Jury Act], which went into effect in 1928 and was suspended
permanently in 1943 . .. . ); Nobutoshi Yamanouchi & Samuel J. Cohen, Understanding the
Incidence ofLitigation in Japan: A Structural Analysis, 25 INTL. LAW. 443, 450 (1991). Israel
has never used juries, and India not since 1961. See STEVEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL
AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN CoURTROOM XV (1994).
"

12. Except in rare situations, such as libel cases, juries are not used at all in civil proceed
ings in England, having been almost completely eliminated by the Supreme Court Act, 1981,
§ 69 (Eng.). See generally JULIUS LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A CoMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH
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racy and fairness of particular verdicts, Americans continue to hold
the jury dear.13 Criminal jury trials continue to be an object of
widespread public interest. Why? What role does the jury play in
our collective self-understanding? Plausible answers to these ques
tions, including the partial response I offer here, will need to be
contingent, socially situated, and subjective.
Fourth, criminal jury trials are relatively rare as a percentage of
total adjudications. Nationwide, a substantial if not overwhelming
majority of criminal convictions are a result of plea bargains rather
than trials.14 In addition, a growing percentage of criminal cases
that do go to trial are, at the election of the defendant, tried before
judges rather than juries.15 These realities have led some commen
tators to conclude that the criminal jury trial no longer plays a sig
nifi.cant role in American life. Albert Alschuler and Andrew Deiss,
for example, maintain that

"[o]nly a shadow of this communitarian

institution has survived into the urbanized America of the late
twentieth century."16 This view overstates the demise of the crimi
nal jury trial. There are, after all, still thousands of criminal jury
trials conducted each year. In addition, trials, however rare, do
provide a bargaining baseline for the vast majority of cases which
result in plea bargains. More to the point, it is a mistake to conflate
frequency with importance.
AND AMERICAN Crvrr, DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS 95-111 {1982). Even in
criminal cases, where jury trials remain available in England, they have become quite rare.
See Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. et al., A Bicentennial Transition: Modem Alternatives to Seventh
Amendment Jury Trial in Complex Cases, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 61, 71 {1988) ("[T]he British
system continues to evolve toward further reduction of the availability of jury trials, even in
criminal cases. "); see also Laura Mansnerus, Under Fire, Jury System Faces Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995, § 1 (National Report), at 9 ("[In Britain,] only 1 percent of civil trials
and 5 percent of criminal trials are heard by juries.").
13. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. 'fyler, The Basis of Citizens' Perceptions of the
Criminal Trial Jury, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 333, 337 {1988) (showing 97% of respondents to
survey viewed the jury as "somewhat or "very" important as a national institution).
14. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNuAL REPORT 12 {1990)
(showing that 86.5% of convictions in federal courts were through guilty pleas or pleas of
nolo contendere); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE CouRTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STA
TISTICS 57 {1988) (showing percentages of all criminal cases disposed of through guilty pleas,
ranging from 46.7% in Pennsylvania to 87.2% in California); RICHARD SoLARI, U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JUDICIAL REPORTING PROGRAM, 1988, at 47 tbl. 4.2a {1992) {deter
mining that guilty pleas account for 93% of state court criminal convictions); see also Neil
Vidmar et al., Should We Rush to Reform the Criminal Jury? Consider Conviction Rate Data,
80 JUDICATURE 286 (1997) (collecting conviction rate data from federal courts and from the
state courts of North Carolina, Florida, California, New York, and Texas).
15. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
the United States, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 867, 922 {1994) ("[N)early half of the convictions in the
cases that go to trial are the products of trials before judges sitting without juries.") (citing
PATRICK A. LANGAN & J OHN M. DAWSON, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE CouRTS, 1988, at 1 (1990)).
16. Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 15, at 927.
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Rare things can matter; and, in particular, they can matter be
cause of what they mean. The actual infliction of the death penalty
is rare, but people care about it a great deal. Flag burning may be
even more rare, yet it has been the subject of heated public and
political debate. The relative infrequency of criminal jury trials
need not mean that they are insignificant. That rarity does suggest,
however, that the importance of the criminal trial jury may lie as
much in its symbolic or expressive value than in its narrowly instru
mental use as a method for determining disputed questions of fact.
B.

Why Argue About Meaning?

Underlying this entire argument is a claim that the social mean
ing of a legal institution is worth arguing about. It is difficult to
know how much need be said in defense of this general point. On
the one hand, I certainly do not claim to have discovered the impor
tance of social meaning in law. Legal Realists, Law and Society
scholars of various stripes, Crits, Feminist Legal theorists, and
Critical Race theorists, just to name a few, have from various per
spectives highlighted the ways in which law can serve to embody,
express, or legitimate underlying social values. In this sense, my
focus on social meaning is nothing new. On the other hand, at least
two concerns prompt me to say something in defense of my particu
lar approach.
First, even though it might be common knowledge that social
meaning matters, it is knowledge often ignored. Lawyers and legal
academics seem willing to confront the meanings or expressive con
tent of rules and practices only when there is nothing else more
manageable to argue about. In this sense we are too often like the
economist in the old joke who is searching under a street light for a
contact lens. A passerby offers to help, and asks the economist,
"Where did you lose it?" Pointing to a dark spot down the street,
the economist says "Over there." "So why are you looking here?"
the passerby asks.

"Because the light is better," responds the

economist.
My second reason for taking space to defend the importance of
social meaning is that, unlike most others who have addressed the
issue, I emphasize meaning as a primary good, rather than as a
means to consequentialist ends. My point is not that we must un
derstand the social meaning of rules so that we might better predict,
understand, or evaluate the substantive impact of those rules. In
this sense, my claim differs from prior work, and in particular from
ideas advanced by Dan Kahan, Tracey Meares, Eric Posner, and
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others who have recently called attention to the role played by the
social meaning of law in securing obedience or achieving deter
rence.17 I argue that we, as a community, might prefer to act nobly
and bravely not only because doing so may accomplish more
effective deterrence, but also because we want to be able to under
stand and describe ourselves as noble and brave.
What do I mean by "we"? Do I suggest that "we" at some level
do or would agree on who we are as a community, if only a
sufficiently appealing vision could be articulated with sufficient
force and clarity? I do not. Despite my liberal use of the :first per
son plural, I do not claim that there is some static and potentially
definable "community identity" just out there waiting to be identi
fied and elucidated. On the contrary, legal institutions play a role
in community identity formation primarily because the question of
who "we" are is perpetually in dispute and because there are few
other places where we might be said to speak as a community. If
the United States were a nation unified by religion, culture, or even
by a powerful common enemy, it might not be necessary for our
legal and political institutions to play a substantial role in the con
struction or maintenance of collective meaning. We are not so uni
fied. We are a diverse and chaotic nation of millions, tied together
by neither common faith nor by common fear but, if at all, by how
we have agreed to describe ourselves.18 If we are to be a com
munity, rather than a mere assemblage, we need for our public in
stitutions (and those who argue about and argue within those
institutions) to provide fora through which we can go about the
business of community self-definition.
By distingllishing a community from a "mere assemblage" and
by positing the importance of community identity formation, I do
not mean for my argument to hinge on any mysterious notions of
collective consciousness. It is possible to argue that a community is
more than just the sum of its individual members - that the well
being of the community need not be understood as merely the ag
gregate well-being of its members. While sympathetic to this per17. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv.
349 (1997); Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CruM.
L. REv. 191 (1998). For a an overview of this emerging approach to the study of social norms
and deterrence, see Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGA L STUD. 661
(1998); see also T OM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
18. Consider Abraham Lincoln's description, in the Gettysburg Address, of Americans as
"dedicated to a proposition" rather than to an institution, faith, or set of substantive goals.
Granted, Lincoln's assertion was an act of construction rather than a historically accurate
description, and one which was not immediately or universally embraced. But the point re
mains. What are we dedicated to?
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spective, I recognize that it is inordinately difficult to articulate
clearly or persuasively.19 Accordingly, I do not rely on such a
claim; or, to be precise, I rely only upon a weak version of the com
munitarian perspective on the individual vis-a-vis society. For pur
poses of my argument, it is enough to posit that individuals might
want to understand themselves as belonging to a community de
fined by certain traits or qualities.20 From there, it is but a small
step to recognize that those traits or qualities might find expression
through the structure and operation of public institutions, including
but not limited to the jury. Put differently, substantive legal dis
putes often serve as proxies for underlying arguments about who
we are as a community.
Granted that the social meaning of the institutions like the jury
may in fact matter to people, what business does a law professor
have arguing about it? Perhaps lawyers and legal academics should
leave it to the sociologists and anthropologists to describe and de
bate what the jury "means" to people in various contexts. Unfortu
nately, we cannot afford to do so. Social scientists, despite De
Tocqueville's precedent, so far have surprisingly little to tell us
about the role played by the jury in modern America:21 Next to the
virtual cataract of social-scientific work on public and institutional
19. In particular, I am sympathetic to the claim, articulated most effectively by Michael
Sandel, that individuals are as much a product of communities as vice versa, and that to
envision people as isolated choosers - unconstrained self-actualizers using communities as
methods of getting what they want or becoming who they want to be - is to miss much of
what makes people who and what they are. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND nm
LIMITS OF JUSTICE

{1982).
20. Accordingly, those uncomfortable with the anthropomorphism implicit in phrases like

"community self-definition" should feel free to substitute them with "individual self
definition through association with a larger group defined by particular traits or qualities," or
any such equivalent formulation. What I do insist upon, however, is that community identity,
however labeled, matters. It would simply be missing what makes us who we are to deny that
communities can be constructed, maintained, and unified by more than their ability effec
tively to aggregate individual materialistic preferences. People define themselves not only by
what they want, but also by what they stand for and who they stand with.
21. A substantial amount of social-psychological work has examined juror decision
making processes. Significant empirical studies include: Phoebe Ellsworth, Are Twelve
Heads Better than One?, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205; Geoffrey P.
Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing
the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401
(1990); Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 539 (1992); and David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion:
A Threat to Justice, 59 JumCATURE 478 (1976). For an overview of research on juror deci
sionmaking in light of recently proposed reforms, see Phoebe Ellsworth & Alan Reifman,
Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, in PSY
CHOLOGY, PuBuc POLICY, & LAW {forthcoming). Regarding proposed
TRIAL lNNovATioNs (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997). What

reforms, see JURY
remain largely un
studied, however, are the attitudes and understandings of the community as a whole toward
the use of juries to decide criminal cases.
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attitudes toward related matters such as crime control and criminal
sentencing,

the

social

meaning

of

the jury

remains

largely

unexamined.22
Social scientific research into public perceptions and under
standings of the criminal trial jury would be particularly useful
given the extent to which public discourse is so heavily dominated
by discussions of particular high-profile verdicts. Trials like those of
O.J. Simpson and the Menendez brothers are exceptional, and it is
at least likely that they are understood as such by the public. The
little available evidence suggests that while many people are dis
satisfied with particular verdicts and particular features of the crim
inal justice system, most Americans continue to view the criminal
trial jury as an important and even defining institution.23 How
members of the public would defend that view, if they chose to,
remains an unanswered question.
In the end, however, the lawyer's work is distinct from, though
hopefully informed by, that of the social scientist. Lawyers need
not only to describe social meaning, but also to argue about it. If
and when social scientists are able to offer thorough accounts of
what the jury means, lawyers will still need to find ways of talking
about what it ought to mean.
There are two closely related reasons why lawyers should learn
to argue about, rather than merely describe, the social meanings or
expressive content of legal rules and practices. Both of the reasons
depend, of course, upon the assumption that many people do in fact
care about those meanings - that substantive rules and policies do
sometimes serve in part as proxies in arguments grounded in com
peting conceptions of community identity. First, a lawyer cannot
represent his or her clients or constituents effectively unless he or
she can find ways of giving voice to the things that really matter to
those clients or constituents. Second, a lawyer cannot argue effec
tively or persuasively unless he or she is able to speak to the things
that really concern those whom he or she is called upon to persuade
or come to terms with. If one's audience - be they judges, jurors,
legislators, members of the public at large, or academic colleagues
- really care, at some deep if not fully articulated level, about the
social meaning of a rule or practice, the best efficiency or deter
rence or other consequentialist arguments are unlikely to move that
audience.
22. A noteworthy exception is MacCoun & 'fyler, supra note 13.
23. See id.
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It is tempting to think that legal academics, as opposed to prac
ticing lawyers or lawyer-politicians, can afford to ignore these sorts
of "irrational" concerns. We cannot. At least we cannot if we de
sire our work to have relevance within the real world in which the
rules and regimes we critique must operate. We cannot afford to
disregard the meaning of rules and practices because to disregard is
to discount. To conclude that a rule or policy is desirable or unde
sirable, wise or unwise, based on an evaluation of consequentialist
concerns such as efficiency or deterrence is to argue about the effect
that rule or policy will have on people. And to make that calcula
tion without accounting for what the rule or policy means to those
people (because meanings are too difficult to evaluate or quantify)
would in some cases be akin to arguing that one's bank account is
more important than one's spouse (because the value of the latter is
so hard to quantify).
In popular media, a lawyer is sometimes described as _a "mouth
piece." Although probably not intended as a compliment, this de
scription need not be understood as entirely pejorative. Setting
aside the questionable implication that lawyers lack moral agency
in the work they do for their clients, society needs mouthpieces. In
a complex world, someone must strive to give voice to the concerns
of their fellow citizens. If, as seems certain, people care about
things like bravery and nobility, those who purport to speak for the
people need ways of talking about those things. If lawyers are to
speak - in courtrooms, in state houses, and through our writings
- to the concerns of our fellow citizens, we cannot simply disre
gard salient concerns because they may be difficult to articulate or
impossible to quantify precisely.
Lawyers, and legal academics in particular, seem to have lost
track of a tremendous amount of territory between first principles
and the bottom line. In some contexts, the importance of social
meaning is evident. For example, in the debate over a potential
constitutional amendment prohibiting the burning of the American
Flag, it is impossible to ignore the expressive and symbolic compo
nents. The issue is, in a sense, all about expression; and the flag is
the very archetype of a socially significant symbol. In other con
texts, however, it is tempting to continue to look at claims about the
expressive or symbolic value of legal rules as arguments of last re
sort - to be called upon only when nothing else is available.
The resulting lacuna - the argumentative gap caused by an un
willingness or inability to argue about social meaning as a primary
good - might be called the problem of the last grizzly bear, be-
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cause it is well illustrated by the discourse of environmental law.
Why would it bother us to cause the extinction of a species? Why
care about the last grizzly bear, or the last bald eagle, let alone the
last snail darter or spotted owl? Environmental lawyers and activist
have of course assembled a repertoire of consequentialist argu
ments for preservation, many of which are quite persuasive.24
These arguments are not wrong,_ but they appear incomplete.25 I
suggest that at least some of our reasons for not wanting to wipe
out the grizzly bear have to do with what it would say about us as a
community if we were willing to do so. Specific environmental is
sues serve to some extent as proxies for deeper concerns about who
we are and how we understand our relationship \vith nature.
Nor is environmental law the only intellectual domain that suf
fers from an inability to argue effectively about social meaning as a
primary good. Why do many people object to chain gangs as a
method of criminal punishment? Are chain gangs likely to have
dangerous social consequences? Perhaps, but the point would be
difficult to demonstrate. Is it the humiliation people object to?
Perhaps, but being forced to dig ditches on the roadside hardly
seems the most humiliating thing many prisoners are required to
endure. Are chain gangs unconstitutionally cruel and unusual?26
The United States Supreme Court has refused to so hold.27 I sub24. For example, perhaps a patch of rain forest holds a bug that will provide a cure for
AIDS or cancer. We will never know if we continue to clear cut. Similarly, environmental
lawyers are masters of the one-way-door argument: if we save it today, we can always decide
to wipe it out tomorrow, but if we wipe it out today, we can never get it back. Economic
arguments are available as well, such as the argument that it is only a market failure (in
particular the failure to account for future generations' utility) which causes us to undervalue
wilderness.
25. See, e.g., David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 619, 693-95 (1994) (arguing that traditional environmental jurisprudence is inade
quate because "[i]t is difficult to include harmony or environmental damage as goods within
the intellectual framework of liberalism").

26. On the constitutionality of chain gangs, see Tessa M. Gorman, Back on the Chain
Gang: Why the Eighth Amendment and the History of Slavery Proscribe the Resurgence of
Chain Gangs, 85 CAL. L. REv. 441 (1997); Sander Jacobowitz, Rattling Chains and Smashing
Rocks: Testing the Boundaries of the Eighth Amendment, 28 RUTGERS LJ. 519 (1997); Nancy
A. Ozimek, Reinstitution ofthe Chain Gang: A Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 6 B.U.
PuB. INT. LJ. 753 (1997); Wendy Imatani Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1459 (1997) (claiming chain gangs
are unconstitutional); and Emily S. Sanford, Note and Co=ent, The Propriety and Constitu
tionality of Chain Gangs, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1155 (1997) (conceding that "chain gangs
would likely survive constitutional attack today").

27. See McLamore v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 934, 936 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Does the chain gang fit into our current concept of penology? If not, does it violate the
Eighth Amendment? This is an important question never decided by the Court."). A ruling
that chain gangs are unconstitutional would represent an exception to the longstanding back
ground rule that requiring prisoners to work is not constitutionally problematic. See United
States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 1 33, 149 (1914) ("There can be no doubt that the State has
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mit that many people object to chain gang� because of what they
say about us as a community. Forget the consequences, and set
aside concerns about cruelty; we as a community, given our history,
still might care about what it means to have a line of black men in
chains paraded down the highway under the supervision of a white
man with a shotgun.
Some scholars have recently demonstrated a willingness to con
front the messy fact that meaning matters. In addition to moral
philosophers and criminal law theorists who have highlighted the
social meaning of punishment, others have come to appreciate the
significance of expressive concerns as a motivating force in the law.
Richard Pildes, for example, has argued persuasively that the doc
trine

of

Shaw

v.

Reno2s cannot be otherwise understood.29

Bizarrely shaped voting districts are troubling because of what they
say about us as a political and social community. If we are to argue
persuasively about voting districts, Pildes argues, we will need to
find ways of appreciating and articulating those expressive con
cerns, however difficult they are to nail down.3o
Nor will it suffice to say that arguments about important legal
policy issues should be severed from the underlying questions of
social meaning with which they are bound - that the formulation
of community identity should take place elsewhere, and not pollute
substantive debates. First of all, there is no elsewhere. There are
no fora through which we speak

as

a legal and political community

other than through our legal and political institutions. We have
modes of expression as individuals and as subgroups within the
community as a whole, but if we are to express what it means to be
a member of the community as whole, we can only do so through
actions taken by that community as a whole. It is of course possible
to imagine hortatory pronouncements by legislatures or a plebiscite
wherein we announce that we would like to be understood, and
would like to understand ourselves, as a brave or honorable people.
But, as the saying goes, actions speak louder than words, and in this
authority to impose involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime."); United States v.
Pridgeon, 153 U.S.48 (1894) ("There is no question but that federal prisoners may be re
quired to work in accordance with institution rules.").

28. 509 U.S.630 (1993).
29. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 1, at 537 ("Shaw thus sets into motion constitutional doc
trine ultimately concerned with social perceptions and collective understanding[] ....").
30. See id. at 484 ("That most people, judges included, recoil instinctively from willfulyl
misshapen districts is understandable enough. Yet defining values and purposes that might
translate this impulse into an articulate justifiable set of legal principles is no easy task.").

·
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case infinitely so. If we consider it important to describe ourselves
as brave, we have to find ways of acting bravely.
The second reason why we cannot hope to sever substantive
policy debates from the underlying questions of meaning for which
those debates often serve as proxies is that we cannot exert com
plete control over the meanings of our actions. Imagine, for exam
ple, that a legislature were to try and argue the propriety of
legislation providing for the use of chain gangs without getting
muddled in the difficult business of what that practice might sym
bolize. Perhaps the sponsors of the chain gang bill could affix a
prologue to the proposed legislation: "The chain gangs provided
for herein should not be interpreted as reminiscent of slavery."
Meanings do not work like that. You cannot spit on a man and tell
him not to take it as an insult. And you cannot behave as a coward
and expect people to take your word for it that you are brave.
Arguments of this sort will prove difficult for lawyers to learn to
make. They will prove difficult not because they are necessarily an
alytically complex, or conceptually subtle, but rather because they
call for a mode of argument, a form of rhetoric, somewhat alien to
legal academic discourse. The social scientist seeking to describe
"attitudes" towards this or that institution may try to describe or
report empirically what the institution "means" to a given group.
The law-and-society scholar can then use that data to argue about
what a given rule or practice will or will not accomplish. The moral
theorist s�eking to argue the rightness or lack thereof of an institu
tion or practice may attempt to demonstrate its consistency or in
consistency with some set of principles. The lawyer, however, who
seeks to

argue about social meaning - who seeks to argue about
what a practice ought to mean - faces a task different from any of

these. Arguments about social meaning, if successful, lead not to
conclusive proof, but to conditional, partial, and temporary assent.
The question is not whether a given social meaning follows neces
sarily from a given rule or practice. Instead, the question is whether
it resonates as consistent with an evolving and multifaceted sense of
community identity. Moreover, arguments about social meaning in
evitably seek to create, as well as to identify, that meaning. The
required mode of argument is therefore neither purely descriptive
nor purely prescriptive.

Instead, the operative rhetorical mode

might best be described as ascriptive - an attempt to ascribe cer
tain meanings to certain practices. The stance is as much one of
invitation as that of argument, and the conclusion, therefore, is less
the logician's "QED" than the preacher's "Can I get a witness?"
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Finally, it would be unwarranted hubris- to presume that those
who would attach importance to meaning are behaving foolishly or
irrationally - to view it as unfortunate that people might place ex
pressive content on a par with, or even above, "real" concerns such
as material benefits, deterrence, or efficiency. While it is beyond
the scope of this paper to examine, or even fully to elucidate, the
position, it certainly cannot be dismissed as presumptively irrational
for a person to believe that meaning contributes as much or more to
well-being than does material comfort, physical safety, or wealth.
That person might point out that history, psychology, and social sci
ence, not to mention theology and philosophy, all provide argu
ments for the proposition that well-being - happiness, if you will
- is only weakly related to material prosperity. This is of course a
difficult and contestable proposition, and one over which social
psychologists in particular have become increasingly engaged. My
point here is that it is not obviously foolish for a person to come to
believe that our mothers were right: more stuff does not make one
more happy.
Beyond this, it would be equally reasonable for a person to con
clude that what does conduce to real well-being, what does make
people happy, is meaning. A person might well come to the conclu
sion that those people are happiest who have found something
worth sacrificing some material well-being for; and that being a
member of a community which stands for something is more impor
tant - more conducive to well-being - than being one of an as
semblage of people who are marginally more wealthy or more safe.
According to such a view, the capacity of an institution to express
or provide a forum for the formation of community identity might
well be as important as the capacity of that institution to achieve
particular consequentialist ends. Again, this paper is hardly the
place to address this fundamental question, but there is no need for
me to do so. It is sufficient to acknowledge that when people our clients, constituents, and fellow citizens - behave as though
the meaning of a practice matters as much as the material conse
quences, we cannot safely or fairly dismiss them as foolish.

ill.

THE MEANING OF JURY REsPONSIBILITY

In this Part, I offer my reasons for believing that the
responsibility-taking function of the criminal trial jury may be
worth recognizing and preserving. I do not, in this Part, delineate
in detail the ways in which this function is manifested and enforced
- a discussion I put off until Parts IV and V. Instead, and at some
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risk of putting the cart before the horse, I focus in this Part on the
more basic question of why responsibility taking might matter.
That said, I can and should perhaps outline briefly the function I
hope to describe and defend. Reduced to its bare bones, my claim
has four elements. First, there are certain difficult and inherently
problematic actions and decisions required of our society. By in
herently problematic I mean actions and decisions which, however
necessary or justified, can and should be troubling to us. Examples
might include the allocation of scarce medical resources and the de
cision to go to war. Guido Calabresi famously termed these inher
ently problematic decisions "tragic choices."31 While I have no
quarrel with Calabresi's label, my argument regarding how we as a
community might desire to respond to those choices is fundamen
tally at odds with his.
The second element of my claim, and the one least provable, is
that we as a community might consider it important to confront
rather than hide from those actions and decisions. Specifically, I
suggest that we might consider it nobler and braver to acknowledge
the necessity for those decisions and actions, and to acknowledge
our role in them, rather than to consign them to some procedural
black box. This is distinct from the related claim that we should
confront rather than hide from troubling decisions because doing so

will encourage us to make those decisions more fairly and wisely.
While I do make those sorts of consequentialist arguments on be
half of my specific claim, I do not rely upon them. Instead, I hope
to explore the more difficult-to-articulate possibility that we might
want to behave bravely primarily because we want to be able to
understand and describe ourselves as brave.
Third, I suggest that judging our fellow citizens, which we do
through the criminal justice system, is just such a difficult and
troubling task. We have, as a community, no complete, shared un
derstanding of when an individual's actions are fairly described as
his or her own "fault." Thus it should not surprise us that judgment
is troubling, for a thorough theory of criminal responsibility would
require nothing less than the resolution of the difficult philosophi
cal problem of free will For this reason, the act of judgment is and
.

will remain inherently problematic. I do not mean that it is unjusti
fied. We have good and sufficient reasons for assigning criminal
responsibility. Judging our fellow citizens is an unavoidable neces
sity - justified, necessary, and troubling. And if one assents to my
31. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
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suggestion that such inherently problematic acts ought when possi
ble to be confronted and acknowledged, rather than disguised and
denied, then perhaps we ought to devise or maintain practices or
institutions through which we as a community, to the extent practi
cable, own up to and accept responsibility for what we find it neces
sary to do.
Finally, my claim is that the criminal trial jury serves as just such
an institution. It would be neither possible nor perhaps desirable
for each member of the community to take personal responsibility
for each act of judgment. But we can take turns.
Two important distinctions are in order. First, I am not arguing
that jurors should be

accountable for their verdicts, whether to the

public at large, to defendants, or to anyone else. In fact, as argued
below, there is a sense in which a certain absence of accountability
- in the sense of a freedom from any obligation to explain or jus
tify verdicts - might be understood as a necessary condition for
the sort of responsibility I would have jurors assume. I am arguing
that jurors ought to feel a sense of responsibility for judgments of
culpability, not that they ought to be held responsible for those
judgments.32
A second distinction is between those rules and practices that
might preserve or engender a sense of resP,onsibility, on the one
hand, and, on the other hand, those rules and practices that might
increase the sense in which the jury is understood to be a
responsibility-taking institution by the community at large. The dis
tinction here is between psychological reality and public meaning.
Stated differently, it might be profitable to sever the question of the
jury's role in the courtroom (the jury's relationship with defendants
and the court), from the question of the jury's role in the com
munity (the public's perception of that role and the meanings at
tached to that perception). Nonetheless, I largely conflate these
two ideas. For the most part, I assume that what increases jurors'
sense of responsibility will also tend to increase the ability of the
jury to be perceived as a responsibility-taking institution.
I make this assumption not because I believe it is necessarily
correct in every case. On the contrary, I readily acknowledge the
32. A related distinction is between the jury as "they " and the jury as "we. " The claim is
not that jurors, as some identifiable subset of the population, are for some reason the right
people to take responsibility for troubling judgments of culpability. Rather, the claim is that
the jury is the institution through which each of us
all of us
takes turns taking responsi
bility. When, therefore, I say "jurors " should do this or that, or when for convenience I
speak of jurors as "they, " I should be understood as saying "each of us, in our occasional
capacity as jurors. "
-

-

2400

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:2381

possibility that some procedures which actually increase juror re
sponsibility might for various reasons not serve to further the ex
pressive purposes I have described, either because the actual effect
of those procedures will be misunderstood or because those proce
dures have other expressive content. I assume a congruence be
tween reality and perception merely because it seems the wisest
default option, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. I am
fully prepared to listen to, and indeed invite, analysis of the extent
to which the rules and practices described below - rules and prac
tices which I argue serve to preserve the jury's responsibility-taking
function - might fail to enhance the jury's meaning as a
responsibility-taking institution.
The debate over the use of anonymous juries can help us under
stand these distinctions. In recent years, an increasing number of
courts and legislatures have been willing to protect the identity of
jurors in criminal trials when necessary for reasons of safety or pri
vacy.33 It has been further suggested that anonymity be routine, in
order to alleviate juror fears, protect juror privacy, and facilitate
better decisionmaking.34 Opponents argue, among other things,
that anonymity will compromise juror accountability.
At first blush it might appear that the claim set out in this article
- we should "look each defendant in the eye," and "stand behind
what we find it necessary to do" - would argue strongly against
juror anonymity. In fact, I am unprepared to take a position on the
issue, for reasons that track and help illustrate the distinctions de
scribed above. First, my concern is with responsibility rather than
accountability. It seems to me unnecessary, and arguably inap
propriate, to hold jurors accountable to the public for their judg
ments. As one commentator has argued, "we do not give jurors the
robes, the tenure, the professional training, and the prerequisites to
make it either fair or appropriate to ask them to play so public a
role."35 My emphasis is rather on how jurors perceive their own
roles and on the public meaning of that perception.
A second difficulty inherent in the question of juror anonymity
tracks the distinction between psychological reality and social
meaning. On one hand, it is at least plausible that jurors free from
any fear of reprisal or harassment will be better able to focus on the
33. See Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous
Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 V AND. L. REv. 123 (1996).
34. See id.
35. Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem ofPostverdict Inter
views, 1993 U. Ju.. L. REv. 295, 314, quoted in King, supra note 33, at 141.
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responsibility they bear in passing judgment. H so, anonymity
might actually facilitate the jury's responsibility-taking role. None
theless, the language used by opponents of anonymity - language
like "noxious" and "star chambers" - suggests that courage would
not be the primary. social meaning attached to the routine use of
anonymous juries. One judge remarked that "[n]ext we'll be put
ting all the judges under hoods."36 Juror responsibility may in gen
eral serve as an expression of courage, but practices designed to
facilitate that responsibility will not further the expressive purpose
if they themselves at the same time express or symbolize, rightly or
wrongly, a form of cowardice.
In Parts IV and V, below, where I describe the ways in which
the jury's responsibility-taking function is fulfilled and might be
protected, I focus on doctrinal elements, which, unlike the question
of juror anonymity, do not appear to present a potential disconnect
between reality and perception. I describe aspects of the criminal
jury trial that may promote an actual sense of responsibility on the
part of jurors, aspects it seems safe to assume do or might also con
tribute to our ability to understand the jury as a responsibility
taking institution expressing or symbolizing the quality I have cho
sen to label "courage." In this Part, however, my aim is to tackle
two logically prior questions. Why might courage be considered
worth expressing? And why might the jury be understood as a
means of expressing it?
A.

The Problem of Judgment

The criminal justice system brings us face to face with a deep
tension in our collective understanding of human behavior. On one
hand, we live in an age of cause and effect. Developments in social
and behavioral sciences have taught us to look for social, environ
mental, genetic, chemical, psychological, or other explanations for
behavior. On the other hand, we recognize the necessity of living
and acting as though notions of individual responsibility are mean
ingful.37 We refuse, and rightly so, to abandon the idea of desert.
36. King, supra note 33, at 123.
37. See, e.g., Thomas A. Green, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of
Pound: An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1915, 1916-17 (1995) (analyzing the
responses of Roscoe Pound and others to the tension between social ideas of cause and effect
and legal/moral notions of free will and personal responsibility); Rachel J. Littman, Adequate
Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the Deconstruction ofFree Wil� 60 ALB. L. REv.
1127, 1130 (1997) (defending free will as a descriptive concept and claiming that "the human
ability to reason and act rationally can never be totally overborne by external influences"
(footnote omitted)); John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of
Responsibility in the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEo. LJ. 2045, 2046 (1988)
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As a consequence, the criminal law struggles mightily with the
question of when it is appropriate to hold an individual responsible
for his or her actions.3s
I make no attempt to canvass the millennia-old moral, religious,
and philosophical debate over free will.39 I simply submit that the
("[W]hile the notion of responsibility traditionally has been viewed as descriptive in nature, it
is in fact an evolving prescriptive concept which serves to delineate the boundaries between
those consequences for which the individual will be held accountable and those for which
society will be so held."}.
38. The resulting tension manifests itself in the criminal law not only through ongoing
theoretical uncertainty over the appropriate definition of mens rea, but also through continu
ing debates regarding specific doctrinal issues such as the insanity defense, the doctrine of
duress, and criminal sentencing.
39. Early sources include the following: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC
WoRKS OF ARISTOTLE 935-1112 (W.D.Ross trans. & Richard McKeon ed., Random House
1941) and Plato, Timaeus, in THE CoLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 1151-211 (B. Jowett
trans. & Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1994). Central
philosophical works on free will would include: B ENEDICT DE SPINOZA, ETHIC (W. Hale
White & Amelia Hutchinson Stirling trans., Oxford Univ. Press .1923) (containing De
Spinoza's philosophy of determinism); THOMAS HoBBES, BoDY, MAN, AND C ITIZEN (Rich·
ard S. Peters ed., Collier Books 1962) (collecting selections from Hobbes representing his
attempt to reconcile free will and determinism); DAVID HUME, AN lNoUIRY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 90-111 {Charles W. Hendel ed., Library of Liberal Arts 1955)
(containing Hume's attempt to reconcile free will and determinism); IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF M oRALS (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Pub·
lishing Co.1981); and JoHN LocKE, AN EssAY CoNCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Pe
ter H. Nidditch ed., Clarendon Press 1975). Among modem book-length treatments, see
EDWARD D'ANGELO, THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM (1968) (maintaining
that human behavior, though caused, is and will remain fundamentally unpredictable);
DANIEL C. DENNET, ELBOW RooM: THE V ARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING
{1985); J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: EssAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
95-118 {1970} {addressing "expressive" value of the notion of responsibility, in that it allows
the community to react to and express attitudes towards given forms of behavior); HANS
JoNAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY 79-135 (1984) {delineating contexts in which the
idea of responsibility is useful or indispensable}; MAruoN SMILEY, MoRAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CoMMUNITY: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM A PRAGMATIC
PoINT OF V mw {1992) (arguing that the philosophical approaches to the question of free will

slight the pragmatic significance of community recognition of individual moral responsibil
ity); GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF (1986) {describing possible alternative philo
sophical approaches to the question of free will}; and DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THB
AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE (Sidney Hook ed., 1958) (collecting articles on determinism and
free will). Among book-length treatments of free will and the law, see FRANZ ALEXANDER
& HuGo STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PuBuc 211-12 {1956) {lamenting the
fact that attempts to make the criminal justice system more progressive and responsive to the
causes of criminal behavior must confront an enduring popular desire for retribution);
HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HAssE, MENTAL DISABILmES AND CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY 117-33 {1979) {addressing the relationship between traditional understand·
ings of free will and the relevance of mental state to criminal responsibility); H.L .A. HART,
PuN!SHMBNT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF L AW 90-112 {1968)

(describing and critiquing traditional legal/moral understandings of individual responsibility);
and JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE {1985)
{describing behavioral causes and explanations for crinie). Shorter works are far too numer
ous to list, but among the most relevant are Paul Campos, The Paradox of Punishment, 1992
Wis. L. REv.1931 {1992) (arguing that "contemporary societies still lack a coherent deonto
logical justification for the social practices that go by the name of punishment "); Richard
Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of
Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAw & lNEo. J. 9, 24-37 {1985) {describing the way in
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problem remains, and is likely to remain for the foreseeable future,
unresolved.40 Nor do I weigh in on any of the myriad disputes,
within substantive criminal law, that implicate the consequent ten
sion and uncertainty. Instead, my aim is to consider whether, and
to what extent, we as a community are willing to confront and ac
knowledge our own personal responsibility for the difficult and per
plexing decisions that an ongoing commitment to the

idea of

personal responsibility requires us to make. My concern here is not
so much with how well we resolve the problem of free will as with
how nobly we confront it.
Consider the terrible act of convicting a man of a crime and sen
tencing him to prison. We know that there are facts about that
man's life - his background, childhood, or genetic makeup which,

if we could understand them fully, would explain his actions.

But to explain is not to excuse; and so we convict. As we should.
We have good and sufficient justifications for holding people re
sponsible for their actions, justifications which need not hinge on
any naive or oversimplified view of free will We recognize, among
.

other things, the need for deterrence and the need to protect our
selves from predation, however explainable. When I describe the
act of convicting a fellow human being as terrible, I do not mean
that it is necessarily wrong. Even if it is right in a given case, fully
justified under the best moral reasoning, it remains disturbing. We
which a poor environment contributes to the development of criminal behavior); Deborah
W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U.PA.
L. RE.v. 615 {1988) (exploring the tension between individual freedom and social protection
or responsibility in assessing culpability based on biological defenses); Patricia J. Falk, Novel
Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the Social Environment Urban
Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. RE.v. 731, 733-74 (1996) (argu
ing that, unlike short-term causal explanations for criminal behavior, novel extensions pro
vide otherwise unavailable insight into criminal behavior); Carl Goldberg, The Reality of
Human Will: A Concept Worth Reviving, 7 PsYCinATRIC ANNALS 566 {1977) (reviewing the
history of the idea of will in modem thought); Lenn E. Goodman, Determinism and Freedom
in Spinoza, Maimonides, and Aristotle: A Retrospective Study, in RE.sPONSIBILITY, CHARAC
TER, AND TiiE EMOTIONS: NEW ARTICLES IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 107 (Ferdinand Schoe
man ed., 1987); Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts
and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. RE.v. 971 (1982); and Ronald J. Rychlak & Joseph F.
Rychlak, Mental Health Experts on Trial: Free Will and Determinism in the Courtroom, 100
W. VA. L. RE.v. 193, 195 (1997) (arguing that courts must "demand that psychological and
psychiatric expert witnesses function within the [free will based] assumptions of the legal
system").
40. This should not be understood as a claim that the problem of free will is unamenable
to moral, religious, or philosophical discourse. Much less do I suggest that attempts to ad
dress the problem are futile. On the contrary, as I discuss below, one of the reasons I con
sider it important for us as a community to confront and come to terms with our agency in
perplexing decisions - meaning here those decisions which implicate our uncertainty over
the idea of free will
is that doing so will keep the pressure on us to work for better and
fairer ways of resolving or dealing with that tension, in general and in its specific substantive
manifestations.
-
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say to a fellow human being, in effect: "We know that each of us, if
born as you were born and faced with what you have faced, may
well have done as you have done. And yet we will judge you. We

will imprison you for ten years, or for twenty, because it is you, and
not us, who has come to be the person you are and to do the thing
you have done."
Liberalism, or, more specifically, a combination of democracy
and the rule of law, offers a partial response to the problem of judg
ment. By seeking to ground our laws in popular consent, and by
working toward a regime in which all citizens have equal input into
the content of those laws, we increase the extent to which any given
individual judged under those laws may be said to have judged him
self or herself. In addition, we strive to couch our laws in general
terms - applicable equally to all citizens - with the aim being that
the law itself, rather than individual men and women, will sit in
judgment.
I embrace the attempt to reduce the extent to which people are
required, or permitted, to sit in judgment on one another. But the
project is and will remain incomplete. However full and equal the
political input, only unanimity would allow us to say that to be
judged under the law is merely to judge oneself. And the idea of
general laws is a legitimating principle, not a literal description.
Laws equally applicable on their face impact some people and not
others.

Moreover, unless laws are generated from behind a

Rawlsian veil of ignorance, those who make or approve laws will be
aware of those differential impacts.41 In addition, however success
ful we may be at reducing opportunities for arbitrariness, no regime
can eliminate entirely the exercise of discretion in the enforcement
phase of the criminal justice system.
The upshot is that we as a community must judge and, on oc
casion, condemn our fellow citizens. If we are thoughtful people,
aware that there but for the grace of God go we, the obligation to
play God in this way should disturb and discomfit us, however justi
fied we are in doing so. Granted, then, that we should judge as
fairly, legitimately, and uniformly as possible, one question remains.
Do we do so bravely and honestly - by designing and maintaining
structures and processes which force us to acknowledge as fully as
possible our agency in the act of condemnation? Or, do we hide
behind a regime of facially neutral procedures in an effort to wash
our hands of responsibility for the fate of those we condemn?
41. See Jo.HN RAwr.s, A

THEORY OF JUSTICE

12, 19 (1971).
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Thomas Green has suggested that the jury might play an ongo
ing role in moderating the tension generated by our uncertainty re
garding free will and criminal responsibility.42 In this article I
follow up on that suggestion. I argue, however, not that the jury
serves as a means of moderating this tension, in the sense of avoid
ing it, or of rendering the troubling act of judgment less difficult or
more palatable. On the contrary, I suggest that the jury serves as a
means of confronting this tension - of ensuring that it remains dif
ficult and does not become more palatable.
Here it is important to distinguish between what makes judg
ment troubling and what makes it difficult. I do not argue that the
act of judgment is difficult primarily

because it is morally problem

atic. As described below, jurors often do find it difficult to bring in
a conviction. And no doubt in some of those cases at least part of
the difficulty may stem from the jurors' underlying uncertainty re
garding the idea of personal responsibility. However, it appears
that jurors find it difficult to convict even when they are fully con
vinced that a conviction is justified. My claim is that the morally
troubling nature of judgment makes it important for us to confront
our responsibility for the judgments we make,
may be difficult to do so.

despite the fact that it

If the polity were small (or if the criminal justice system had
if all that mattered about the
system were the extent to which we as a community confront our
agency in it, we might aim to design a system in which all or a sub
stantial portion of the community were involved in each act of con
demnation - in which each of us had to look into the eyes of each
of those we judged. But resources are far from unlimited. And I
readily acknowledge that the conscience-implicating function I de
scribe is far from all we care about. We need a criminal justice sys
tem that is workable. We need a system that will, with limited
resources, achieve its substantive ends as well and fairly as possible,
whether those aims be deterrence, debilitation, rehabilitation, or
even retribution. I acknowledge as well that these ends might often
best be served through the reduction of individual agency in the
system.
access to unlimited resources), and

If, therefore, we want to avoid the ignobility of anonymous con
demnation, we might design a system in which at least some of us
were forced to acknowledge what we do. We might take turns. We
might seek structures though which some number of us, drawn, per42. See GREEN, supra note 37.
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haps, from as wide as possible cross-section of the community, were
forced to look each defendant in the eyes.

How many of us?

Twelve might be as good a number as any. The jury is one of the
places - one of the few places - where each of us is asked to take
a turn facing up to what it is that we as a community are required to
do. Jurors stand in for the community not only as decisionmakers,
but also as responsibility takers.
Contrast my argument with that made two decades ago by
Guido Calabresi.43 Calabresi focused on the civil jury and argued
that it is just the sort of institution that ought to be employed in
making choices of the sort which I have described as perplexities,
and which he terms tragic choices - decisions as to which one of
the available alternatives appear morally unproblematic. As an ex
ample, Calabresi cites the allocation of limited medical resources,
such as kidney dialysis machines, "[which] compels a tragic choice
because the assignment of the machine to one patient necessarily
implies the otherwise unacceptable decision to allow other patients
to die from renal failure."44 According to Calabresi,
The jury's representativeness and lack of responsibility [which] have
at times been identified as the reason why certain decisions are com
mitted to it . . . [are] the source of the characteristic and powerful way
in which the jury operates. Juries apply societal standards without
ever telling us what those standards are, or even that they exist. This
is especially important in those situations in which the statement of
standards would be terribly destructive.45

Initially, Calabresi's primary example seems a poor fit with the
actual work done by civil juries. As George Priest has noted, the
allocation of limited medical resources is not in fact entrusted to
civil juries, which adjudicate relatively few matters that could be
described as tragic choices. 46

One might, however, apply

Calabresi's claim with more effect to the criminal jury, which, as I
have suggested, faces a "tragic choice" each time it brings in a con
viction. In the criminal context, Calabresi's argument, or one quite
similar, has a distinguished pedigree. Montesquieu couched it as
follows:
The power of judging should not be given to a permanent senate but
should be exercised by persons drawn from the body of the people .
In this fashion the power of judging, so terrible among men, being
.

43. See CALABRESI

.

& BoBBrIT, supra note 31.

44. George L. Priest, The Role ofthe Civil Jury in a System ofPrivate Litigation, 1990 U.
Cm. LEGAL F. 161, 168 (citing CALABRESI & BoBBrIT, supra note 31, at 186-89).
45. CALABRESI

& BoBBrIT, supra note 31, at 57 (citations omitted).

46. See Priest, supra note 44, at 168-69.
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attached neither to a certain state nor to a certain profession, be
comes, so to speak, invisible and null. Judges are not continually in
view; one fears the magistracy, not the magistrates.47

Juries, on this reading, take the sting out of difficult judgments by
preventing the people from fixing responsibility for those judg
ments on any specific agent or institution of government.48 I sug
gest, to the contrary, that juries help keep the sting in difficult
judgments by ensuring that at least some of us will be unable to
avoid fixing responsibility on ourselves.
The judging of our fellow citizens is of course only one of many
perplexing decisions a community must make. As Calabresi sug
gests, the allocation of limited resources can also give rise to situa
tions in which none of the available options seems unambiguously
correct.49 Along lines more closely related to those traced in this
article, Markus Dubber has described the American system of capi
tal punishment as "a complex system of denying and dispersing re
sponsibility for the infliction of pain."50

In Dubber's view, a

collective inability to justify or come to terms with the infliction, as
opposed to the threat, of death as a criminal sanction manifests it
self in a "mad and futile scramble to deny personal responsibility
for the necessarily violent aspect of law."51 The process represents
a modem and sophisticated version of allowing one member of the
firing squad to fire a blank. Dubber objects to these evasions and
argues that each participant in the capital punishment process, from
legislator to judge to jury to governor to prison official, should be
encouraged to feel a greater sense of agency in making substantive
choices about the infliction of death.52 His implication appears to
be that a greater willingness to confront the reality of capital pun
ishment would render us as a community less willing to impose it.
47. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 158 {Anne M. Cobler et al. eds. & trans.,
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought 1989) (1748).
48. Charles Clark, speaking of civil juries, and of the governmental agents most likely to
bear the brunt of that responsibility, observed that jury decisionmaking "relieves the judges
of the burden and the odium of deciding close questions of fact in cases, such as personal
injury actions, where the feelings of the litigants are apt to run high." Charles E. Clark,
Co=ent, Union of Law and Equity and Trial by Jury Under the Codes, 32 YALE L.J. 707,
711 {1923). Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel similarly listed, among the "collateral advan
tages" of the jury system, that juries serve as a "lightning rod for animosity and suspicion
which otherwise might center on the more permanent judge . . . •" See KAI.VEN & ZEISEL,
supra note 4, at 7.
49. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 31,
50.

Markus Dirk Dubber,

51. Id.

at

605-06.

52. See id.

at

608-11.

at

18-19.

The Pain of Punishment, 44 BUFF. L.

REv.

545, 545 {1996).
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I am unconvinced by Dubber's implication that an unwillingness
to confront the reality of a practice reveals a belief that that prac
tice is unjustifiable. As I argue below, it can be hard to face what
one must do even when one is truly convinced that it ought to be
done. Moreover, his prescription - that everyone in the process
be encouraged to feel agency - is doomed to failure. Responsibil
ity, I argue, requires a fixed locus; and for the reasons I suggest, the
jury would appear to be the best candidate. Dubber is on the mark,
however, when he describes the way in which our current system
facilitates the denial and shifting of personal responsibility for the
actual infliction of the death penalty. In this light, one might argue
that a truly courageous community would confront and acknowl
edge agency in all of its tragic choices and troubling actions. I focus
on the perplexity inherent in assigning criminal responsibility; but
why stop there? Perhaps we should require some individual or
group of individuals to sign their names to decisions allocating or
gan transplants. Perhaps we should not allow any executioner to
fire a blank. In a sense, however, the

assignment of criminal re

sponsibility is unique. Unlike allocation decisions, and unlike even
the infliction of pain or death - both of which may be under some
circumstances more troubling than the fixing of blame - the act of
judgment itself presupposes a commitment to the idea of personal
responsibility. It would seem particularly ignoble, not to mention
hypocritical, to assign personal responsibility while at the same time
denying any personal responsibility for that assignment. It may be
too much to ask that we confront, and judge ourselves, for every
difficult thing we do, but we should at least be willing to judge our
selves for our judgements.
B.

The Expression of Courage

Insofar as it may be helpful to put a name to the quality we
might hope to express through a willingness to confront the per
plexity of judgment, the term courage seems to me apt. It will be
objected that courage means different things to different people
and that labelling something or someone as courageous or cowardly
represents a conclusion rather than an argument.

Describing a

practice as brave, one might object, simply does not prove anything
about whether that practice is a good idea. I agree. I use "courage"
to refer narrowly to a particular trait which seems to me admirable
- the willingness to confront and acknowledge agency in what one
finds necessary to do. Accordingly, my argument does not hinge on
whether or not "courage" is the appropriate label for that trait,
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though it seems to me fitting. Instead, my argument hinges on the
question of whether that trait, that willingness, is in fact admirable.
This sort of argument, I readily acknowledge, admits of no
proof. I can no more prove a quality admirable than I can prove a
symphony beautiful or a landscape sublime.53 The question, in the
end, is what kind of people we want to be. And this question, while
an appropriate subject of argument, cannot be an object of proof.

All I can do is describe the sort of courage I suggest we might care
about, and contrast it with the sort of cowardice we might want to
eschew.
In the spirit, therefore, of illustration rather than demonstration,
permit me an imperfect analogy. Parents sometimes find it neces
sary to punish or discipline their children. Some might use "time
outs," or the denial of certain privileges, or grounding, or even
spanking; but some form of discipline seems an inescapable if un
fortunate aspect of rearing responsible children. Now, imagine if it
were possible to delegate that responsibility entirely, not just par
tially as we do when we send our children to school. Imagine a new
service, whereby parents could distance themselves entirely from
the act of discipline by paying the service to monitor their children's
behavior and administer appropriate punishment. Parents could
choose what sort of behavior to punish, how to punish it, and how
severely, but the service would do the rest. Imagine further that the
service, by virtue of the expert training and emotional detachment
of its employees, would do a better job than parents. It would
never be fooled, never make a mistake, and, unlike parents, never
punish too mildly out of weakness or too severely out of frustration
or anger.
I suggest that many of us would choose not to employ such a
service were it available. Many of us would consider it important to
discipline our own children, even if we are unable to do so as ef
ficiently (or even as fairly) as might be possible through some sort

53. The analogy to aesthetics is imperfect but potentially illustrative, given the way in
which arguments about the social meaning or expressive content of public practices can be
dismissed as irreducibly subjective - "just a matter of taste." It is a matter of taste, but it
need not be "just" that An inability to agree upon a definition of beauty has not prevented
people from talking and arguing about it. Moreover, it is at least possible that an aesthetic
approach may provide a way of addressing or grounding discussion of troubling normative
issues. By learning to talk about bravery and beauty, we may better learn how to talk about
right or wrong. Kant's final work is an attempt in the direction of just such a moral aesthetic.
See DIETER HENRICH, AEsrHEnc JUDGMENT AND TIIB MoRAL !MAGE OF TIIB WoRLD:
STUDIES IN KANT 29-56 (1992); lMMANuEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (James
Creed Meredith trans., Clarendon Press 1952) (1790).
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of delegation. Punishing our children, however necessary,

ought to

hurt us more than it hurts them.
The analogy to the family is imperfect for a number of reasons,
not the least of which is that the sense of personal attachment and
obligation one feels to one's own children is qualitatively different
from that which one is likely to feel toward fellow citizens of the
polity. Again, analogies of this sort illustrate rather than prove. In
this case, the analogy at least suggests, or so I hope, that there are
some actions which we would not be willing to pay someone else to
do for us. I further suggest, and this is the unprovable part, we have
a term for someone who would hide from the unpleasant necessity
of disciplining his or her own children by delegating that responsi
bility. The term is "coward."
To reiterate, my goal here in this subpart is merely to illustrate
what I mean by courage. If, through examples of this sort, I can
capture or give a sense of the quality I suggest may be expressed
through a willingness to use juries in criminal trials, I will have done

all I can. It is not for me ultimately to say whether this quality,
once described, is in fact worth having or expressing. That depends
on what kind of people we want to be. What I do maintain, how
ever, here and throughout the remainder of this article, is that if we
consider this form of courage and forthrightness worth cultivating
and expressing, the criminal trial jury is an institution well suited to
that expression.
Before returning, however, to the question of how and why the
jury might be understood to symbolize this form of courage, con
sider an alternative analogy designed to flesh out further the nature
of the quality itself. This analogy is drawn from the world of busi
ness, where the personal bond, which makes the family example of
limited application, cannot be presumed. Suppose you run a busi
ness, employing sales representatives, and that you have established
certain bare minimum performance standards for your employees.
In line with those standards, you have determined conditions under
which an employee should be fired - that a certain combination of
performance failures or misbehavior should lead to termination. If,
for example, an employee is late for work more than ten times in
one quarter, and fails to meet sales quotas for six straight months,
and has unsatisfactory performance evaluations from his or her su
pervisor for four consecutive quarters, then, according to your pol
icy, that employee is to be fired. In order to be completely fair, you
make sure all employees are fully familiar with the standards - the
policy is described in the employee handbook as the "firing line."
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In addition, you provide training, counseling, and other assistance
to employees who seem to be in danger. All in all, you have no
doubt that you do in fact want to let go any employee who fails to
meet these minimal requirements and that you are fully justified in
doing so.
Now, suppose your software vender describes to you a new and
inexpensive program. The program will collect data from account
ing, personnel, and sales, and will determine

if and when

any em

ployee has crossed the "firing line." In addition, the program can
be designed actually to do the deed. Firing a person, as anyone who
has had to do it knows, is an unpleasant experience. The program
could take you off the hook. Once an employee meets the condi
tions for termination, the computer would issue and mail a sever
ance check, freeze the employee's access to company records, and
cancel his or her corporate credit card. The computer would also
generate a polite email message informing the employee that he or
she has been terminated and instructing the employee to clean out
his or her desk. Would you make use of that program? Or would
you feel an obligation to look the employee in the eye and deliver
the news yourself? More to the point, what would it say about you
and your operation to make use of that program to avoid having to
confront the person you have decided to fire? Is this the kind of
operation you would want to work for, let alone design?
Although I do not mean for my argument to tum on whether or
not courage is the best label for the characteristic or trait poten
tially expressed by a decision to put the act of judgment into the
hands of juries, the term does offer a way of distinguishing between
several related and overlapping qualities which might go under that
name, only some of which I believe are plausibly symbolized by the
use of criminal trial juries. One sort of courage would be a willing
ness to act, in specific cases, in a way consistent with principles we
as a community purport to define ourselves by. For example,

if we

stand for, or purport to stand for, a certain vision of free speech,
perhaps we should have the courage to stand by that commitment
even in cases where the speech in question is of a form we dislike or
would prefer to live without. Although this is the form of courage
which might be initially suggested by the title of this article, it is not
my focus here. I do not argue that using juries symbolizes a willing
ness to apply general principles to specific cases. On the contrary,
and as I acknowledge below, the use of juries may come at some
cost to this type of consistency with principles.
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Instead, my claim is that the use of juries may be understood to

express a willingness to do two things: first, to

confront the specific
acknowl

consequences of whatever we decide to do; and second, to

edge our own agency in and responsibility for bringing about those

consequences. The form of courage I refer to is not a willingness to

act in this way or that, but rather a willingness to stand behind

whatever actions we take. Perhaps one might choose another label
for this quality: forthrightness, honor, frankness, or nobility come

to mind as possibilities. In any event, the focus here is less on act

ing rightly than on taking responsibility for actions. The opposite of
courage, as I

am

In the end,

if

using the term, is not hypocrisy but cowardice.

one believes that taking responsibility for one's

difficult decisions is unimportant - that this form of courage is not

worth having or displaying - then this part of my argument will fall

on deaf ears. By arguing that a willingness to acknowledge agency

in judgments is admirable and by using the language of courage to

flesh out that claim, I do, not appeal to or assume the presence of an
unambiguous preexisting shared understanding of courage or cow

ardice. Rather, this article represents an effort to contribute to and

participate in the ongoing effort to construct such an understanding.
C.

Consequentialist Arguments

Although I have insisted that social meaning matters for its own
sake, and that we as a community might prefer to behave bravely
simply because we prefer to understand ourselves as brave, I am

not a purist on the point. Given the extent to which objections to
my concrete recommendations are likely to be of a consequentialist

nature, it is worth noting that there are instrumental arguments for

my position. I hesitate in making these arguments, however, out of

fear that my overall claim will be understood to hinge upon them.

It does not. Making instrumental arguments against cowardice is

like arguing that one should not spit on one's mother because it
spreads germs. It may do that, but to highlight that fact risks mis

sing the point. With that caveat, however, I am willing to offer

three consequentialist arguments for confronting the perplexity of

judgment - for implicating the conscience of as many of us as pos

sible when judging our fellow citizens.

First, and most concretely, we might make fairer laws to the ex

tent that we know that we, or at least some of us, will have to ac

knowledge responsibility for the particular human consequences of

those laws. In a sense, this is a variation of the argument tradition
ally made on behalf of jury nullification. The traditional claim is
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that juries protect citizens from the State and mitigate the harsh
and potentially unfair particular consequences of general laws by
occasionally exercising their power to nullify.54 My claim, however,
is somewhat different. I suggest that our awareness that we will
have to confront the human consequences of our laws might cause
us to make those laws more fair in the first place.
To the extent that lawmakers, and those who vote for
lawmakers, understand themselves as potential jurors, this ex ante
·

deterrence function (deterring, in this case, lawmakers rather than
lawbreakers), might function directly: "Do not support a law im
posing a given criminal sanction unless you are willing to look a
man in the eye and impose that sanction." Given, however, that
most of those who support or vote for a given law will not antici
pate having to enforce that particular law themselves, the effect is
likely to be more indirect: "Do not support a law imposing a given
sanction unless you believe that twelve of your fellow citizens will
be able to look a man in the eye and impose it."
A second instrumental argument, albeit one closely related to
the first, might go under the heading of moral or political cost
intemalization. Assume we make our laws as fair as possible; they
will still give rise to troubling consequences. Social and economic
realities, coupled with human frailty, will continue to give rise to
criminal behavior. That behavior, in tum, will continue to need to
be punished, deterred, and protected against through criminal sanc
tions. To the extent that we force ourselves to be troubled and dis
comforted by the necessity of imposing those sanctions, we may be
motivated to work towards eliminating or abating the conditions
which contribute to criminal behavior. Dysfunctional families, drug
addiction, ravaged neighborhoods, poor schools, racism, and pov
erty (moral and economic) should trouble us primarily because of
what they do to our fellow citizens. Perhaps we should also be trou
bled, and motivated, by what they make us do to our fellow citizens.

It might appear that fear of crime itself ought to motivate a
community to mitigate the social and economic circumstances giv
ing rise to that crime. Why should one expect that the discomfort
inherent in imposing punishment will serve any additional motivat
ing function? If people will not work for social change in order to
prevent crime, why would they work for social change in order to
avoid having to punish criminals? Two reasons: For one, the
54. See infra sections III.D & IV.D (outlining the arguments surrounding the question of
jury nullification and situating my overall thesis within those arguments).
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classes of potential jurors and potential crime victims are not neces

sarily congruent. Not only do criminals emerge primarily from and

inhabit the low end of the socioeconomic spectrum, so too do crime

victims.55 Granted, the rich fear crime, and see themselves as po
tential victims, but they are also able to devise ways of protecting
themselves. Those who are most free from deprivation are also

able to shield themselves from much of the criminal behavior gen

erated by that deprivation.56 Build a high enough wall, and it may

be possible to avoid confronting either crime or the underlying so
cial conditions which contribute to it. For some, jury service may

provide a rare opportunity, albeit an unwanted one, to look closely
at what lies on the other side of the gate.
More to the point, juries are forced to look at particular

criminals rather than at crime in general.57 Knowing about and

fearing crime, even being a victim of crime, however painful and

disturbing that may be, can allow one to retain a sense of righteous

ness. Having to decide that a man or woman will spend the next

twenty years in prison is different - it implicates one in the system.

It dirties one in a way that being a victim or potential victim does

not.

·

In addition, jurors must confront the individual who has come to

be a criminal. They see at close quarters the man or woman whose

life need not have taken this course. Assume they are fully justified

in bringing in a conviction and that they do so. Assume that they
have no doubts about the necessity of judging as they have. They
may still come to wish for a world in which the thing they have done

is less often necessary. The strength of this argument depends upon
55. For example, people in families with annual incomes less than $7500 experience a
crime victimization rate of 89.5 per 1000. By contrast, those with annual incomes over
$75,000 experience a crime victimization rate of 38.2 per 1000. See URIE BRONFENBRENNER
ET AL., THE STATE OF AMERICANS: THE DISTURBING FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHANGING
VALUES, CRIME, THE EcoNoMY, POVERTY, FAMILY, EDUCATION, THE AGING POPULATION
AND WHAT THEY MEAN FOR OuR FUTURE 22 fig. 1-17 (1996), cited in Peter M. Cicchino,

The Problem Child: An Empirical Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of Child Poverty in the
United States, 5 J.L. & POLY. 5, 28 (1996); see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce
ment Act of 1994, H.R. REP. No. 103-324 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1804
("The impact [of violent crime] is particularly harsh in poorer communities, many of which
are literally being destroyed by violence
); CHARLES MURRAY, LosING GROUND:
AMERICAN SOCIAL PouCY, 1950-1980, at 119-20 (1984).
.

.

•

."

56. See EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA (1997)
(describing the ways in which the well-off seek to protect themselves from crime methods,
including hiring private security, living in closed or walled-off neighborhoods, installing
alarms or other security devices, and insuring valuables).
57. As the United States Supreme Court has observed in the context of capital sentenc
ing, the jury is required to focus on the defendant as a "uniquely individual human being."
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
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the extent to which juries are truly representative and provides an
argument for ensuring that jurors are drawn from a true cross
section of the community.
Finally, and most long term, is an argument situated at the place
where consequentialist concerns meet claims of social meaning. If
we allow ourselves to become a cowardly people - if we begin to
deal with perplexities by hiding from them - what will we allow
ourselves to do next? Granted that judging and punishing criminals
as we do is pragmatically necessary and morally justified, there is no
guarantee that our future public acts will be equally laudable. His
tory has shown what can be done by people who do not feel agency
in their actions - who understand themselves as merely playing a
role in a larger system, or just following orders. If we get into the
habit of ducking responsibility for our tragic choices, or get used to
delegating them to people who know not what they do, it becomes
increasingly likely that we will allow ourselves to take that small but
terrible step from cowardice to cruelty.
D.

Meanings and Consequences

Having offered a set of consequentialist arguments for asking

the jury to play a responsibility-taking role, I readily acknowledge
that there may be attendant risks. The most obvious risk may be

that of nullification. By nullification I refer, here and throughout
this article, to a decision on the part of a jury to acquit a defendant
despite believing that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.58
One possible risk attendant on asking that each of us take a turn
looking defendants in the eye is that occasionally we will blink.
Those of us called upon to embody the community and to acknowl
edge our agency in judgments of culpability will sometimes shrink
from the task. In section IV.D below, I return to the issue of jury
nullification, and to the question of whether recognizing the jury's
responsibility-taking function might shed light on the uncertain
legal status of nullification. Here, however, let me make the pre
liminary and simplifying assumption that nullification is simply un58. I recognize that one might use the term nullification more broadly to refer to any
decision by a jury to disregard the law. In the criminal context, for example, a jury might
convict despite believing a defendant to be innocent of the crime charged. It is this sort of
"nullification" against which rules excluding prejudicial evidence are intended to guard. See,
e.g., FED. R. Evm. 404(a) (excluding evidence of "character or a trait of character . • . for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith"). I focus on the question of nullification
acquittal not because I believe that nullification convictions are unproblematic. On the con
trary, I assume that it is always a bad thing to convict an innocent defendant. The question
that generates impassioned debate is whether we should tolerate, or even encourage, the
occasional acquittal of an guilty defendant.
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desirable. I make this assumption not because I believe that it is
necessarily correct, but rather because my goal here is to acknowl
edge the risks potentially attendant upon making jurors aware of
their responsibility for and agency in criminal convictions. Nullifi
cation is a risk only to those who believe it to be a bad thing. The
question, therefore, is how we might think about the intersection
between that clearly identifiable (if difficult to quantify) risk, on the
one hand, and the inchoate social meaning potentially expressed by
encouraging juror responsibility, on the other.
In framing this question, it seems safe to make a further assump
tion that, however important we consider the expression of cour
age, we would not desire to increase juror's sense of responsibility
beyond the point of reason. So, in outlining below the ways in
which that sense of responsibility might be enforced or engendered,

I do not recommend extreme or bizarre measures. For example, I
do not suggest that jurors be required to pay daily visits to the fami

lies of those they have convicted. I do not suggest that jurors be

required to visit or correspond regularly with those they have sent
to prison. I do not suggest that capital juries be required to attend

or preside at executions. While steps such as these would certainly
engender a sense of responsibility and would certainly fix the con
sciences (in the retrospective sense) of jurors, such measures would
with equal certainty inhibit the ability of jurors to bring in convic
tions when warranted.
The question, therefore, is how to evaluate the risks which
might attend the more modest measures described below. And that
only experience can tell. The risks may not, however, be as great as
might first appear. As an initial matter, cases of actual nullification
are arguably quite rare. Opponents of nullification, particularly in
the popular press, often argue anecdotally, pointing to certain high
profile verdicts such as the O.J. Simpson criminal verdict as evi
dence that "jury nullification is undermining our system of jus
tice."59 One academic has gone so far as to describe the United
States as "in an age of radical and frequent acts of criminal jury
nullification."60 I have located no evidence in support of these dire
descriptions. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how one might mea
sure the rate of nullification. As Judge Weinstein has pointed out,
59. Daniel Levine, Race Over Reason in the Jury Box, READERS DIGEST, June 1996, at
123.
60. Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vision to Substantially
Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary Blueprint for Re·
modeling Our National Houses ofJustice and Establishing a Separate System ofFederal Crim·
inal Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 535, 609-10 (1996).
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distinguishing "between a 'right' outcome - a verdict following the
letter of the law - and a 'wrong' one - a 'nullification' verdict can be dangerous, and this endeavor depends largely upon personal
bias."61 In addition, not every "wrong" verdict represents a case of
nullification. One must distinguish, for example, cases in which ju
ries doubt the credibility of state witnesses whose testimony on its
face appears to support a conviction. Mistrust of the police may be
troubling, but it is not the same thing as disrespect for the law. Sim
ilarly, one must distinguish cases in which juries are simply mis
taken, or confused, rather than defiant.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that making juries aware of their
role in embodying community conscience would increase the likeli
hood of an acquittal. As described below, prosecutors know how to
exhort juries to their duty. Recognizing the possibility of nullifica
tion, prosecutors have developed

a repertoire of arguments

designed to achieve just that end.62 We cannot know whether we,
in our capacity as jurors, will be courageous unless and until we give
ourselves the opportunity to display courage.
Assume for the sake of argument, however, that we will not al
ways be up to the task - that jurors will on occasion be unwilling
to convict if forced to acknowledge agency in the conviction. As
sume that convictions would decrease by 1 % , or even 10%, which
seems highly unlikely. And assume further that all of those addi
tional acquittals would be unwarranted. What we as a community
then need to decide is if that cost is worth paying. It is often de
scribed as better to let ten guilty men go free than to convict even
one innocent. We might similarly decide that it is better to convict

65%

of defendants bravely than to convict

70%

by behaving as

cowards.
In deciding whether to accept some increase in unwarranted ac
quittals, it is important to keep in mind that unwarranted acquittals
themselves represent just a fraction of unpunished crimes. Before a
defendant can be acquitted, he must become a defendant. The
crime must be solved, the police must choose to make an arrest, and
61. The Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and
Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 239 (1993).
62. One of my personal favorites is the "summer soldier" argument, in which the prose
cutor quotes Thomas Paine to the effect that no one needs "summer soldiers" who will only
turn out in support of the community when the going is easy. Instead, the argument goes, we
all need to take our turn doing the difficult and unpleasant work of citizenship. Interestingly,
a version of this argument is described in a journal published by the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, in which defense lawyers are advised to exhort jurors not to be
"summer soldiers and sunshine patriots in following the law of reasonable doubt." Ray
Moses, The Last Word, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 51.
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the State must elect to prosecute. As Albert Alschuler has noted,
"[W]hen the discretion of prosecutors and other officials not to en
force the law is not only tolerated but applauded, it is difficult to
argue (as prosecutors, of all people, often do) that affording a dis
pensing power to jurors would bring the rule of law to an end. "63
Add to this the fact that the vast majority of defendants plead guilty
or no contest, and that most of those who do go to trial are con
victed, and the question of nullification comes into perspective. To
the extent that jury nullification is a problem, it is arguably not be
cause the already substantial number of unpunished crimes may
thereby increase by some small increment. Rather nullification is
potentially troubling because of what it means.
Contrary to those who appear to believe that nullification, how

ever rare, must be interpreted as disrespect for the law, I am unwil

ling to draw any oversimplified conclusions as to the social meaning
of nullification. It seems inescapable that juries that nullify do so
for a variety of reasons.

Some juries may simply be merciful.

Others may believe that the defendant's actions should not be con
sidered criminal at all. Other juries may nullify because they be
lieve the attendant punishment (or what they are able to guess
about the punishment) is out of proportion with the crime. As
Thomas Green has detailed, nullification has a long, rich social his
tory.64 A refusal to convict need not mean anarchy.
To this I add that a willingness to risk such a refusal may itself
be meaningful. It may mean not that we lack respect for the law,
but that we have respect for ourselves - that we are willing to trust
ourselves to have the courage to look into the eyes of those we are
forced to judge.
What this further suggests is that the question is not simply one
of balancing material costs against inchoate meanings. The matter
is more complicated. Perhaps, for example, some material costs are
necessary for an action to be meaningful. Perhaps an effective ex
pression of courage, honor, or other aspect of community identity
requires that we demonstrate, rather than merely announce, our
commitment to that self-description. It is hard for an act that costs
one nothing to stand for much more.
63. Albert W. Alschuler, A Teetering Palladium?, 79 JUDICATURE 200, 201 (1996) (re
viewing STEVEN ADLER, THE JuRY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN CouRTROOM
(1994) and JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DE·
MOCRACY (1994)).
64.

See Green, supra note 9.
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Accordingly, in thinking about the manifestations of juror re
sponsibility described in Part IV below, and the recommendations
for engendering juror responsibility in Part V, it should not only be
asked whether the risks imposed by these measures are too great a
cost to pay for the expression of courage. It should be asked as well
whether the costs imposed by these measures are

large enough

to

allow them to carry that expressive content.

IV.

MANIF'EsTATIONS OF JURY REsPONSIBILITY

If the jury does in fact perform the role I ascribe to it, one would
expect to find that role reflected in the practices and procedures
governing the criminal jury trial. I do not maintain that this func
tion has been explicitly delineated through the case law and rules
surrounding the j ury trial.

On the contrary, the jury ' s

responsibility-taking function has not been expressly described or
defended, and for that reason has gone unappreciated. I do main
tain, however, that aspects of the procedural and evidentiary struc
ture surrounding the jury, as well as aspects of the language
employed by courts in maintaining that structure, make more sense

if understood

as informed by an awareness that the jury does and

should perform this function.
I use the phrase "informed by an awareness" rather than "moti
vated by an intention" because I am not making a, strong claim
about the conscious intent or motivation of the many judges, law
yers, and litigants who have contributed to the evolution of the
criminal justice system. As Charles Nesson has observed:
Rules that evolved without conscious design may now serve impor
tant objectives that are not consciously appreciated. The evolving
pattern of the system may thus shed light on its underlying values;
inversely, the positing of such values may help to explain the existing
structure of the system.65

Imagine a person who prides himself or herself on a neatly
manicured lawn and a perfectly washed and waxed car. He or she
might come to recognize that these tastes are in part manifestations
of an underlying but not consciously appreciated desire for order.
This realization might help that person better understand not only
his or her attention to the lawn and car but also other seemingly
unconnected aspects of his or her life. I suggest that aspects of the
criminal jury trial are in part manifestations of an underlying but
not consciously appreciated desire to preserve the j ury's
responsibility-taking function.
65. Nesson, supra note 4, at 1369.
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In particular, four aspects of criminal jury trial practice can be
illuminated in this way: the invocation of "conscience" in argu
ments to and about juries, judicial concern that certain forms of
evidence or testimony will "usurp the role of the jury," the doctrine
of

Caldwell v. Mississippi, and the continuing uncertainty over the

legal and conceptual status of jury nullification.
A.

The Invocation of Conscience

The jury is frequently referred to as the "conscience of the com
munity," or variations on that theme. In many cases, this usage can
be explained by reference to the jury's primary role as factfinder. I
suggest, however, that the language of conscience is not fully expli
cable by reference to the jury's traditionally recognized decision
making function. In at least some cases it points to and reveals an
implicit awareness of the responsibility-taking function ascribed to
the jury in this article. The jury serves as the "conscience of the
community" in that the jury is the institution through which we
acknowledge and accept responsibility for our judgments - the in
stitution through which our individual consciences are implicated in
those judgments.
The term "conscience" has a long history in connection with the
institution of the criminal trial jury. In one early formulation of the
reasonable doubt standard, for example, jurors were instructed to
convict only

"if

the evidence is sufficient to satisfy your con

science. "66 As Barbara Shapiro has demonstrated, the "satisfied
conscience" language was common in seventeenth- and eighteenth
century criminal jury instructions.67 Shapiro has argued that, his
torically, this language should be understood as epistemological, ex
pressing merely a belief that, with absolute certainty always out of
reach, " [j]ury verdicts must be based on the very highest knowledge
available to humans in matters of fact."68 Although I am unpre
pared to challenge Shapiro's extensively documented historical
claim, it does seem to me that something is lost by understanding
references to conscience as nothing more than epistemological.
66. BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE":
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TiiE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 14 (1991) (cita
tion omitted).
67. See id. at 38.
68. Id. at 27. Shapiro attributes this understanding in part to Locke's Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, see LoCKE, supra note 40, and its incorporation into legal doctrine in
part, to early treatise writers such as Geoffrey Gilbert and John Morgan. Her overall claim is
that the reasonable doubt standard and its precursors should be understood as a response to
developments in epistemology that highlighted the pervasiveness of uncertainty in human
knowledge.
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And one need only glance at the OED to see the rich and varied
etymology of the term. It is not my goal to trace that etymology,
nor even to trace the history of the term in connection with the jury.
Instead, the question is this: What does it mean, in the context of
the modem jury trial, to say that juries function as the "conscience
of the community"?
In some cases, conscience appears to mean nothing more than
common sense or sound judgment.69 References to the jury as the
conscience of the community in such contexts do not ascribe any
additional role to the jury beyond its traditional one as factfinder
and judge of witness credibility. Similarly, substantive law under
some circumstances incorporates a community standard. The most
familiar example might be the negligence standard in tort, at least
one understanding of which refers to the reasonableness of the de
fendant's behavior in the eyes of the community. In this sense,
when the jury is asked to "represent the feeling of the com

munity,"70 it is being asked for something like expert testimony. Ju

rors are deemed the best authority on the behavior of "the ideal
average prudent man, whose equivalent the jury is taken to be."71
In such contexts, the term "conscience" might mean merely a
"sense of what is considered appropriate or acceptable." This ap
pears to be the manner in which the language of conscience is used
69. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 560-61 (1992) (In a child pornogra
phy case in which defendant claimed entrapment, "[i]t was, however, the jury's task, as the
conscience of the community, to decide whether Mr. Jacobson was a willing participant in the
criminal activity here or an innocent dupe."); Middleton v. Reynolds Metals Co., 963 F.2d
881, 884 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The role of the jury in interpreting the evidence and finding the
ultimate facts is an American tradition so fundamental as to merit constitutional recognition.
The conscience of the community speaks through the verdict of the jury." (quoting Horton v.
Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Ky. 1985))); United States v. Dwyer,
843 F.2d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Confidence in our jury system leads us to leave credibility
solely to the jury which, as the conscience of the community, is expected to act with sound
judgment." (quoting United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 24 (2d Cir. 1979))).
70. O.W. HoLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAW 111 (1881), reprinted in 3 THE CoLLECTED
Woru<s OF JUSTICE HoLMES 109, 171 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995).
71. Id.; see also, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court ex reL
Brown, 927 P.2d 1260, 1278 (Cal. 1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("As the conscience of the
community, the jury plays an essential role in the application of the reasonable person stan
dard of care."); 'l\veedley v. 'l\veedley, 649 A.2d 630, 633 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994)
("The jury is the conscience of the community in tort cases, articulating and imposing mini
mum standards of civilized behavior." (quoting Hutchings v. Hutchings, No. 05449S, 1993
WL 57741, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 1993))). Consider, for example, the instruction
approved four decades ago by the United States Supreme Court in a case upholding an ob
scenity statute against a challenge that the statute was impermissibly vague:
In this case, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you and you alone are the exclusive judges
of what the common conscience of the community is, and in determining that conscience
you are to consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated,
the religious and the irreligious - men, women and children.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957).
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in the death penalty context, where juries play a role (either final or
advisory, depending upon the jurisdiction) in sentencing.72
Where substantive law does not expressly incorporate a com
munity standard, descriptions of the jury as the conscience of the
community are more difficult to interpret. What role is the jury
being asked to play? One such role is that of "defense against arbi
trary law enforcement."73 Asking criminal trial juries to act as the
conscience of the community might be a way of asking them to nul
lify - to refuse to convict
if a particular application of the crimi
-

nal law would offend community standards. In the words of the
United States Supreme Court, "The availability of trial by jury al
lows an accused to protect himself against possible oppression by
what is in essence an appeal to the community conscience, as em
bodied in the jury that hears his case."74 This seems also to be the
implication of Judge Bazelon's oft-quoted assertion that "the very
essence of the jury's function is its role as a spokesman for the com
munity conscience in determining whether or not blame can be
imposed. "75
I return in section IV.D below, to the uncertain status of jury
nullification, but for now it is sufficient to note that if usage is any
guide, references to the jury as conscience cannot always be under
stood to refer to nullification, or even lenity, given that the phrase is
most often employed not by judges or by defense lawyers, but by
prosecutors.76 Prosecutors regularly attempt, and are frequently
permitted, to argue that the jury must serve as the "conscience of
72. In the sentencing phase of the trial of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, the
district court instructed the jury in part,
Your role in this process is to be the conscience of the community in making a moral
judgment about the worth of a specific life balanced against the societal value of what
the government contends to be - or is the deserved punishment for these particular
crimes. Your decision must be a reasoned one free from the influence of passion, preju
dice or any other arbitrary factor.
United States v.McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1222 n.50 (10th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1148 (1999); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (stating that the function of
the sentencing jury is to "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question
of life or death ").
73. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.145, 156 (1968).
74. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554-55 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (holding that trial by jury in adjudicative stage of state juvenile
court delinquency proceeding is not constitutionally required).
75. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C.Cir.1972) (Bazelon, C.J., con
curring in part and dissenting in part).
76. I have not examined the use of the language of conscience by defense lawyers in
criminal cases. While such an investigation might well be interesting or illuminating, my goal
here is merely to shed light on one potentially problematic use of the term conscience - that
by prosecutors - rather than to catalogue or comment upon the full range of usage of the
term.
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the community."77 The courts attempt to distinguish between ex
horting and inflaming.

If the prosecutor's argument appears in

tended to inflame the jury or to encourage the jury to convict in
response to outside factors such as community expectations or de
terrence unrelated to the particular defendant's guilt or innocence,
the court will hold community conscience arguments improper.78

If, on the other hand, the prosecutor appears only to be exhorting
the jury to its duty, closing arguments using "conscience of the com
munity" are generally permitted.79
77. See, e.g., Uni ted S tates v. Alloway, 397 F.2d 105, 113 (6th Cir. 1968) (permitting pros
ecutor t o argue t o jury that "[y]ou the jurors, are called up on i n this case t o be the world
c onscience of the com m unity. A nd I'm calling on this jury to speak out for the com m unity
and let the John Alloways know that this type of conduc t will not be tolerated , that we're not
going to tolerate"); Wilson v. S tate, 697 N.E.2d 466, 477 (Ind. 1998) (approving jury i nstruc
tion, tendered by prosecutor and given by the trial court i n a noncapi tal murder case, that
"[y]ou are further instructed that in determining the criminal responsibility of the D efendant,
if any, that you are the m oral conscience of our soc iety"); S tate v. Pat terson, 966 S.W.2d 435,
446 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (holdi ng that prosecutor's reference to jury as "consc ience of
the community" was not improper).
78. See, e.g., U ni ted S tates v. Ghazaleh, 58 F.3d 240, 246 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he type of
appeal we have considered improper i s one where the prosecutor urges the jury t o send a
message to all drug dealers in the community by convicting the defendant."); United S tates v.
Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 770 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that prosecutor's closing argument ex
horting jurors t o act as a "bulwark" agai nst drug dealing was improper and inflammatory);
Uni ted States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1148 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding i t i mproperly inflam
matory to exhort the jury " t o tell her and all of the other drug dealers like her - (defense
counsel's objection and Court's response om i tted) - [t]hat we don't want that stuff in North
ern Kentucky and that anybody who bring s that stuff in Northern Kentucky and . . .");
Coreas v. U nited S tates, 565 A.2d 594, 604 (D.C. 1989) ("A rgument which encourag es the
jury to 'send a message' has been found improper . . . ."); Powell v. United S tates, 455 A.2d
405, 410 (D.C. 1982) (holding that the question "isn't i t ti m e that this jury, acting as the
consci ence of this community, stood up and sent a message loud and clear to [the defend
ant?]" was "i rrelevant and inappropriate"). In c ivil cases also, an appeal t o jurors t o be the
conscience of the community will be found objectionable where i t appears calculated t o focus
the jury's attention on community expec tations rather than on the fai r resolution of the case
at hand. See, e.g., Westbrook v. General Trre & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir.
1985) (per curiam).
79. See, e.g., Uni ted S tates v. D urbin, No. 96-30223, 1997 WL 464626, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug.
7, 1997) ("A prosecutor's appeal to the jury to act as a 'consc ience of the communi ty' i s
acceptable unless i t i s 'specifically designed t o inflame the jury."' (quoting Uni ted S tates v.
Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984))); United S tates v. Will iams, 989 F.2d 1061 , 1072
(9th Cir. 1993); Uni ted S tates v. S m i th, 918 F.2d 1551, 1562-63 (11th Ci r. 1990) (holding that
prosecutorial appeals to the jury to act as the commun i ty conscience are perm issi ble "when
they are not i ntended to i nflame"); United S tates v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir.
1976) ("Unless calculated to inflame, an appeal to the jury to ac t as the conscience of the
community is not impermissible."); State v. Campbell, 460 S.E.2d 144, 156 (N.C. 1995) (hold
ing it proper to urg e the jury to ac t as the voice and conscience of the community). Some
courts, those i n Massachusetts, for example, have been less tolerant of prosecutorial "con
sc ience of the community" arg uments. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Matthews, 581 N.E.2d
1304, 1310 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) ("It was also i nappropriate for the prosecutor to tell the
jurors that they were 'the conscience of the community.' They bear no such burden; thei r
role i n a trial is limited to finding the facts on the basis of the evidence, dispassionately and
impartially."). Even there, however, the comments must be inflammatory in order to be
objectionable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. S m i th, 444 N.E.2d 374 (Mass. 1983) (barri ng pros
ecutor's words, which, i n effec t, connoted that defendant "should not be let loose on soci-
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What do prosecutors mean when they ask jurors to act as the
conscience of the community, given that they are certainly not ask
ing for nullification? One explanation might be that they are asking
for just the opposite. Just as defendants would,

if

permitted, ask

juries to acquit "according to conscience" despite evidence support
ing a conviction under the law, perhaps prosecutors are implicitly
asking juries to convict according to community conscience - in
response to community expectations, for example - not\vithstand
ing any uncertainty regarding the guilt or innocence of the particu
lar defendant. H so, such arguments would be improper not only
under the case law described above, but also as a matter of basic
fairness. H defendants are barred from asking for lenity outside of
the law, surely prosecutors should be precluded from asking for
vengeance (or even deterrence) outside of the law.80 It is possible,
however, to interpret prosecutorial, conscience-of-the-community
arguments in a way that does not attribute improper motives to
every prosecutor who makes such arguments and that may help ex
plain why so many courts have found such arguments acceptable.
Prosecutors appear to have learned through experience that, in
the eyes of at least some jurors, judgment is indeed a terrible thing.
Those whose job it is to ask juries for convictions have learned that
turning in a conviction can be a difficult thing to do, even for jurors
convinced that a conviction is warranted and fully justified. It is for
this reason that prosecutors often augment talk of conscience with
that of courage. In a marijuana distribution case, for example, the
prosecutor asked the jury in closing argument to "please have the
courage to go out there and :find these Defendants guilty and come
back and return guilty verdicts, because we need juries like your
selves that have the courage to do that."81 It takes guts to look a
man in the eye and convict, even if one is certain that a conviction is
deserved.
ety"); see also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 540 N.E.2d 1316, 1321 {Mass. 1989) (stating that a
verdict of guilt would end victims' nightmares); Commonwealth v. Ward, 550 N.E.2d 398, 406
(Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (criticizing prosecutor's rousing summons that "sounded a persistent
theme that the jury had a duty to confront crime in the streets bravely and to avenge the
wrong done the victim").
80. See, e.g., James Joseph Duane, What Message Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors
When We Ask Them to "Send a Message" With Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 565, 581-82
(1995) (categorizing "conscience of the community" arguments with "send a message" argu·
ments, and arguing that such arguments represent improper attempts to shift the jury's atten·
tion away from guilt or innocence and toward community expectations or deterrence
unrelated to the particular defendant's guilt or innocence).
81. See United States v. Caballero, 712 F.2d 126, 131-32 {5th Cir. 1983) ("A fair reading
of the closing argument confirms the accuracy of the district judge's ruling that the prosecu
tor made a vigorous, but permissible, plea for law enforcement.").
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In the recent Florida trial of an arms dealer, the prosecutor's
closing arguments included the following:

I leave you with one last thought to help you with th[e] difficulties [of
deciding this case]. It's a quote John Kennedy gave just shortly
before he was inaugurated president, quoting Luke 12:24. And he
said: For those to whom much is given, much is required. And when
at some future date the high court of history sits in judgment of each
of us, determining whether in our brief span of service we have ful
filled our obligations to the state, the answers to those questions will
be determined by the responses to four questions: Are we truly men
of dedication? Are we truly men of judgment? Are we truly men of
integrity? And were we truly men of courage? Back in that jury
room you have a difficult job to do. Walk back there and be men and
women of dedication, judgment, integrity, and, most important, cour
age. Do what you have to do and then get on with the business of
living.82

In a North Carolina murder case, for which the death penalty was
not being sought, the prosecutor put it this way:
Ladies, Gentlemen, when you hear of such acts, you say, gee, some
body ought to do something about that. I want you to look around.
You're that somebody that everybody else talks about. . . . So, folks,
you might as well look around. There is no mythical somebody hiding
in this Courtroom. You are the somebody. You, the buck, as bad as
you hate it, stops right here with you twelve people.
Today you are the moral conscious [sic] of that community. It's up
to you to see that justice is done.83

Though ungrammatical, "as bad as you hate it" seems apt. But why
hate it?
In some cases, judgment will be difficult

-

will weigh on the

conscience - in the sense that it is hard to be certain whether one
is doing the right thing. But anecdotal evidence suggests that at
least some jurors find it difficult to convict even when they are per
suaded a conviction is justified. Anyone who has spent time in a
criminal courtroom will recall scenes of jurors in tears as they bring
in a conviction. In addition, postverdict interviews tend to confirm
that jurors struggle mightily with the burden of judgment.84 In what
82. United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1401 (11th Cir. 1997) (alteration in original)
("These comments merely reiterated and exhorted to the jurors their duty to obey their oaths
and to decide the case with dedication, judgment, integrity, and courage. The remarks by the
prosecutor were as likely to lead to an acquittal as a conviction.").
83. State v. Larrimore, 456 S.E.2d 789, 812 (N.C. 1995) (alteration in original).
84. Nancy Marder has examined reports of postverdict interviewers with jurors and,
under the heading "The Difficulty of Judging," reports the following:
Occasionally jurors in post-verdict interviews comment on the difficulty inherent in the
act of judging. Eight percent of the jurors' total comments included some reference to
the process of decisionmaking as difficult, painful, or upsetting. Comments varied
among jurors but the sentiment remained the same. For example, one juror in the
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way is one's conscience implicated by turning in a fully justified
conviction?. I suggest that jurors' consciences are implicated be
cause they are being asked to play the role I have described. They
are being asked to look at, and confront their agency in, the act of
judgment. Not only does it implicate the conscience to make a
tough decision - to figure out what one must do: it also may weigh
upon the conscience - and thus require courage - to confront
what one must do.
The term "conscience" thus has both an outward or forward
looking aspect

and an inward or retrospective aspect. In the first

sense, conscience is a guide to behavior. We hope that our con
science will steer us toward right action. There is also, however, an
inward or reflective sense of the term, as when a person is described
as having a "clear conscience" or a "guilty conscience." That usage
refers to conscience not as a guide to action but rather as a mental
state - a state of awareness of responsibility for actions taken.
Shakespeare's Hamlet illustrates both senses of the word "con
science." When Hamlet says that "conscience does make cowards
of us all," he is talking about the difficulty inherent in figuring out
what to do. When he schemes that "[t]he play's the thing/ Wherein
I'll catch the conscience of the King," he is, however, talking about
something else entirely. He is talking about bringing the King face
to face with what he has done.ss
I suggest that the jury may serve as the conscience of the com
munity in both senses. Not only might we hope that a community
based sense of right and wrong will guide juror decisionmaking in
appropriate cases, we might recognize as well, and thereby better
comprehend the various uses of the term "conscience," that the jury
Oliver North trial described the process as "the most difficult decision of [her] life,"
while another in that case described herself as "mentally and physically exhausted." A
juror in the 'fyson trial described decisionmaking as "a difficult thing to do." In the
Rodney King civil suit, one juror recounted "br[eaking] down in tears on several occa
sions," "be[coming] sick to her stomach from watching the taped beating," and being
"haunted" by King's screams, while another described how "some nights he tossed and
turned in a fitful slumber with the day's debate playing over and over in his head." A
juror in the Gotti trial described decisionmaking as "tough," whereas a juror in the trial
of Colin Ferguson, who was convicted of several counts of murder and attempted mur
der in the shooting of several passengers on the Long Island Railroad, described the
process as "a once in a lifetime experience that was very, very draining." The foreman in
the Crown Heights trial, speaking for the entire jury, described the jury's task as "not
easy" and "very nerve-racking," and the mother of a young juror in the Reginald Denny
beating explained that her daughter "had never before been forced to make difficult
decisions like this."
Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures, A Study ofPost-Verdict Interviews ofJurors,
82 lowA L. REv. 465, 484-85 (1997) (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original).
85. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 1, I. 82, act 2,
sc. 2, 11. 604-05 (G. Blakemore Evans ed., 2 Riverside Shakespeare 1974).
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is the institution through which some of us are forced to an aware
ness of our responsibility for what we do.
B.

The Caldwell Doctrine

George Priest has described the jury as "aresponsible," in light
of the fact that jury verdicts are largely immune to review.86 In a
sense, however, this characterization gets it exactly wrong. If, as I
have suggested, being "responsible" is understood to mean, at least
in part, "taking responsibility" - acknowledging agency - then
perhaps only the unreviewable are capable of performing the role.
Perhaps only those who know they have the last word will feel truly
responsible for their actions. To be specific, if jurors are to act as
the conscience of the ·community in the way I have described, they
need to understand two things. First they should know that they do
in fact have the last word - that no one will go behind them and fix
what they have done. Second, they should understand that the last
word is in fact theirs - that no one can or will tell them what to do.
If jurors' consciences are to be fully implicated, they must un
derstand themselves to be acting, rather than merely deciding. For
this to be the case, they must understand that no one - no higher
authority - stands between them and the fate of the defendant.
This concern may be best illustrated by Caldwell v. Mississippi. 87
There, the United States Supreme Court reversed a death sentence
imposed after the prosecutor had emphasized to the jury that any
decision they reached would be subject to appeal.
In closing argument, defense counsel asked the jury to "confront
both the gravity and the responsibility of calling for another's
death."88 In response, "the prosecutor forcefully argued that the
defense had done something wholly illegitimate in trying to force
the jury to feel a sense of responsibility for its decision."89 The
prosecutor argued:
·

Now, they would have you believe that you're going to kill this man
and they know - they know that your decision is not the final deci
sion. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable. They
know it. Yet they . . . [are] insinuating that your decision is the final

86. See Priest, supra note 44, at 168.
87. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
88. Caldwel� 472 U.S. at 324 (quoting the defense counsel's argument to the jury as: "I
implore you to think deeply about this matter. It is his life or death - the decision you're
going to have to make . . . . You can give him life or you can give him death. It's going to be
your decision. . . . You are the judges and you will have to decide his fate. It is an awesome
responsibility, I know
an awesome responsibility.").
89. 472 U.S. at 324.
-
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decision and that they're gonna take Bobby Caldwell out in front of
this Courthouse in moments and string him up and that is terribly,
terribly unfair. For they know, as I know, and as Judge Baker has told
you, that the decision you render is automatically reviewable by the
Supreme Court.90

In vacating the sentence, the Court concluded that "it is consti
tutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determina
tion made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defend
ant's death rests elsewhere."91 The Court further observed that
"the uncorrected suggestion that the responsibility for any ultimate
determination of death will rest with others presents an intolerable
danger that the jury will in fact choose to minimize the importance
of its role."92
Similar concerns were expressed by the Eleventh Circuit in re
viewing a capital sentence imposed in Florida.93 Under Florida's
capital-sentencing scheme, the jury's recommendation was merely
advisory. Nonetheless, it violated the Eighth Amendment to allow
the prosecutor to minimize the jury's responsibility by repeatedly
emphasizing that: "You understand you do not impose the death
penalty; that is not on your shoulders. . . . You will have the oppor
tunity after you have heard everything there is to hear to make a
recommendation . . . . But it is not legally on your shoulders,
though. It is not your ultimate decision."94 The court held that
"[u]nder such circumstances, a real danger exists that a resulting
death sentence will be based at least in part on the determination of
a decisionmaker that has been misled as to the nature of its
responsibility. "95
The

Caldwell doctrine offers an example of a situation in which

the jury's awareness of its responsibility has been considered cen
tral. In this light, it seems plausible to look for other circumstances
90. 472 U.S. at 325-26.
91. 472 U.S. at 328-29.
92. 472 U.S. at 333; see also Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1986) (vacating
death sentence). In Wheat, the prosecutor first described the appellate procedure in detail
and then argued as follows:
Again, I say to you, and then I'll leave it to you, just remember this, if your verdict is that
of the death penalty, that's not final. There's so many more people who will look at this
case after you have made your decision in this case. Others will look at it, and look at
your work, and see if you've made the right decision. And I can assure you, Ladies and
Gentlemen, that if one finds that you have not, that they will send him back, and tell us
to try it over, because someone made a mistake.
793 F.2d at 527-28 n.7.
93. See Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane).
94. 844 F.2d at 1455.
95. 844 F.2d at 1455.
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under which the failure on the part of the jury to acknowledge re
sponsibility for a verdict may be, if not unconstitutional, at least
troubling. It would be a mistake, however, to make too much of

Caldwell

and its progeny. First of all, the doctrine applies only to

capital cases.96 Second,

Caldwell has

been interpreted narrowly to

apply not to all statements that might diminish the jury's sense of
responsibility, but only to false and misleading statements likely to
have that effect.97 Finally,

Caldwell was

about fairness rather than

courage. The improper attempt to diminish the jury's sense of re
sponsibility violated the ·Eighth Amendment because of the pos
sibility that the jury might not otherwise have imposed the death
penalty.
Accordingly,

Caldwell offers only indirect support for my

claim

that the responsibility-taking role of the jury should be valued in its
own right. I argue, however, that

Caldwell-like concerns

the narrow boundaries of the doctrine itself.

Caldwell observed,

transcend

As the Court in

death penalty jurisprudence is informed by the

assumption that "jurors confronted with the truly awesome respon
sibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due re
gard for the consequences of their decision. " 98 Capital sentencing
need not be understood as unique in this regard. Sentencing a per
son to prison may lack the finality of death, but that hardly makes it
a less than "awesome responsibility"; and one might hope that
criminal juries would in general have "due regard for the conse
quences of their decision[s]."

96. The court's decision was grounded in a belief that "the qualitative difference of death
from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capi
tal sentencing determination." See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329 (quoting California v. Ramos,
463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
97. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994) ("As Justice O'Connor supplied the fifth
vote in Caldwell and concurred on grounds narrower than those put forth by the plurality,
her position is controlling. Accordingly, we have since read Caldwell as 'relevant only to
certain types of comment - those that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing pro
cess in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing
decision.' Thus, '[t]o establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that
the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law."'
(citations omitted)). In addition, the doctrine has not been applied retroactively. See Sawyer
v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (stating that the Caldwell rule is not a watershed rule of crimi
nal procedure fundamental to integrity of criminal proceeding and, thus, a prisoner whose
murder conviction became final before rule was announced could not use rule to challenge
his capital sentence in federal habeas corpus action).
98. Caldwel� 472 U.S. at 329-30 (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208
(1971)).
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Usurpation and Abdication

In addition to understanding that they have the last word, juries
should understand as well that there is no one to whom they can or
should defer in determining what that last word should be. Recog
nizing the responsibility-taking role of the jury may thus help ex
plain judicial resistance to certain forms of expert testimony and
scientific evidence. If expert testimony or scientific evidence ap
pears sufficiently authoritative, jurors may be tempted to ease their
sense of responsibility for a verdict. I do not mean that jurors will
abdicate their decisionmaking function; they still have to decide
whose

experts

to

believe.

Rather, jurors

may

evade

their

responsibility-taking role; they may understand themselves as
merely deciding whose experts to believe.
Courts have repeatedly greeted new forms of evidence with con
cerns that such evidence will usurp the role of the jury. Tradition
ally, this concern manifested itself in the form of testimonial
limitations. Lay witnesses were precluded from offering opinions;99
and expert \vitnesses were precluded from testifying to "ultimate
issues. "100 While the opinion rule and the ultimate issue rule have
been largely abandoned,101 judicial uneasiness over certain forms of
expert testimony persists. For example, courts continue to resist ex
pert testimony on witness credibility, including testimony regarding
polygraph results.

Contrary to one commentator's assertion that

" [t]he objection that an eyewitness expert usurps the jury's role by
giving an expert opinion of witness credibility has largely been
99. The opinion rule was a nineteenth-century co=on law offshoot of the rule requiring
witnesses to have personal knowledge. The personal knowledge rule, in tum, traces its his
tory to at least the fifteenth century, with Coke's assertion that it "is not satisfactory for the
witness to say that he thinks or persuadeth himself." Rolfe v. Hampden, 73 Eng. Rep. 117,
118 n.15 (K.B. 1622); see also Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 415
(1952); Maury R. Olicker, The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony: Time to Take the
Final Leap?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831, 835 (1988). For a discussion of the opinion rule, see
CHAfu.Es ALAN WRIGHJ' & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 6252 (1997).
100. The leading case stating the ultimate issue rule was United States v. Spaulding, 239
498, 506 (1935) (ruling that medical expert testimony that plaintiff was "totally and
permanently disabled" was inadmissible because "[t]he experts ought not to have been asked
or allowed to state their conclusions on the whole case").

U.S.

101. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits lay witnesses to offer opinions
that are "rationally based on the perception of the witness and . . . helpful to a clear under
standing of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." See FED. R. Evm.
701. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides that expert testimony "is not objectionable be
cause it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." See FED. R. Evm.
704(a). An exception to Rule 704 retains the ultimate issue bar as to expert testimony on
"whether the defendant [in a criminal case] did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto." See FED. R. Evm.
704(b).
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abandoned, " 102 many courts continue to exclude expert testimony
about credibility, and on just that basis.103 Similar concerns have
been expressed in the debate over polygraph evidence.104
So long as one understands the function of the jury as being
solely that of factfinder, however, this concern appears to reduce to
nothing more than a mistrust of the jury's ability to evaluate evi102. Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert
PsYcHOL. Ptm. PoLY. & L. 909, 922 {1995).

Testimony About Eyewitness Memory,

1

103. See, e.g., United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1439 {4th Cir. 1988) (en bane) ("[A]n
opinion on the credibility of a witness by a psychiatrist is not allowable."); United States v.
Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 {2d Cir. 1988) ("[W]itnesses may not opine as to the credibility of the
testimony of other witnesses at the trial."); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (stating that expert scientific evidence "may in some circumstances assume a pos
ture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen"); United States v. Wertis, 505 F.2d
683, 685 {5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) {finding opinion of psychiatrist as to whether a witness
could distinguish truth from nontruth was "beyond the competence of any witness"); United
States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 {9th Cir. 1973) {finding that expert testimony on credibil
ity "may cause juries to surrender their own co=on sense in weighting testimony");
Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 451 {D.C. Cir. 1967) {"It has often been argued
that in the guise of an expert, the psychiatrist became the thirteenth juror, and unfortunately
the most important one."); Co=onwealth v. O'Searo, 352 A.2d 30, 32 {Pa. 1976) ("To per
mit psychological testimony . . . would be an invitation for the trier of fact to abdicate its
responsibility to ascertain the facts relying upon the questionable premise that the expert is
in a better position to make such a judgment"); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and
The Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 165, 195 & n.165 (1990)
{"Courts have also excluded expert testimony about credibility as unfairly prejudicial on the
ground that the jury will accord it exaggerated importance. The expert would usurp the role
of the jury by substituting the conclusions of the expert for the independent conclusions
drawn by the lay jurors." (citing United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 {8th Cir. 1986),
where the court stated that "putting an impressively qualified expert's stamp of truthfulness
on a witness's story goes too far")). Some courts have been more lenient and have held that
the admission of such testimony is within the discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., Bastow v.
General Motors Corp., 844 F.2d 506, 510-11 {8th Cir. 1988); Azure, 801 F.2d at 339-40; State
v. Kim, 645 P.2d 1330, 1339 n.14 (Haw. 1982) ("Essentially, the difference between an opin
ion as to character for truthfulness and an opinion as to the believability of a witness' [sic]
statements is the difference between 'I think X is believable' and 'X's statement is believa
ble.' We feel the admissibility of either statement should not turn on niceties of phraseology
but on the probative value of the testimony."); United States v. Pacelli, 521 F.2d 135, 140 {2d
Cir. 1975) ("[W]hether or not psychiatric testimony is admissible to impeach the credibility of
a witness is within the discretion of the trial judge.''). See generally 28 WRIGHT & GoLD,
FEDERAL PRACI1CE AND PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE supra note 99, § 6114 {1993).
104. See, e.g., Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1396-97 {9th Cir. 1984) (arguing that poly
graph evidence "interferes with . . . the deliberative process"); United States v. Alexander,
526 F.2d 161, 168 {8th Cir. 1975) (arguing that polygraph evidence is "likely to be shrouded
with an aura of near infallibility"); Alexander, 526 F.2d at 168-69, quoted in U.S. DEPT. OF
DEFENSE, MANuAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 48 {1995) ("To the extent that the polygraph re
sults are accepted as unimpeachable or conclusive by jurors, despite cautionary instructions
by the trial judge, the jurors' traditional responsibility to collectively ascertain the facts and
adjudge guilt or innocence is preempted.''); Dowd v. Calabrese, 585 F. Supp. 430, 434-35
(D.D.C. 1984) (arguing that juries would likely give undue deference to polygraph evidence);
State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628, 651-53 {WIS. 1981); Kenneth A. Wittenberg & Kenneth L.
Si=ons, Troth or Consequences: The Changing Dynamics of Polygraph Tests, 58 OR. ST. B.
BULL. 23, 24 {1997) {"Those that oppose the use of polygraph exams . . . believe that science
usurps the jury's role when it purports to claim which witness is telling the truth."); see also
David Gallai, Polygraph Evidence in Federal Courts: Should It Be Admissible?, 36 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 87, 103 (1999).
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dence.105 Seen in this light, the language of usurpation seems mis
placed. Wigmore, for example, maintained that such talk was "a
mere bit of empty rhetoric."106 He argued that no witness can
usurp the jury's role because "the jury may still reject his opinion
and accept some other view, and no legal power, not even the
judge's order, can compel them to accept the witness's opinion
against their own."107 Perhaps the real concern is that juries will be
bamboozled

-

will be overawed by scientific-sounding expert testi

mony. This fear, however, appears largely unwarranted. For exam
ple, research does not support the claim that juries give inordinate

weight to expert testimony on credibility.ios Similarly, evidence

suggests that juries would not in fact overestimate the reliability of
polygraph evidence.109
105. See Maury R. Olicker, The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony: 1ime to Take
the Final Leap?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831, 849 (1988) ("[A]t the heart of the matter, underly
ing the ultimate issue rule was an assumption that jurors would abdicate their factfinding role
to the witness. Judges apparently felt that . . . jurors could easily be led to whatever ultimate
conclusion was desired by the proponent of the expert testimony."); Teri Breuer, Note, The
End of Frye is the Beginning of Successful Sexual Assault Prosecution, 2 S. CAL. RBv. L. &
WoMEN's STUD. 333, 338 (1992) ("The courts are also concerned with the possibility that the
expert would usurp the role of the jury. Courts fear that the jury would substitute the conclu
sions of the expert for its own independent conclusions, especially as the expert's testimony
approached ultimate issues.").
106. 7 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920, at 18 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev.
ed. 1978).
107.

Id. § 1920, at 19.

108.

See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-Law Approach
to an Expert's Opinion About a Witness's Credibility Still Does Not Work, 55 BROOK. L. REV.
559, 604-16 (1989); Charles Robert Honts, Assessing Children's Credibility: Scientific and
Legal Issues in 1994, 70 N.D. L. REv. 879, 896 {1994) ("There does not seem to be any reason
to suspect that direct expert testimony on child witness credibility will have the magical pow
ers to overwhelm juries that other scientific evidence lacks."). See generally Michael W.
Mullane, The Truthsayer and the Court: Expert Testimony on Credibility, 43 ME. L. RBv. 53
(1991).
109. See, e.g., Ann Cavoukian & Ronald J. Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Polygraph
Evidence in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117 (1980); Charles R.
Honts & Mary V. Perry, Polygraph Admissibility: Changes and Challenges, 16 LAW & HuM.
BEHAV. 357, 366 (1992) ("Studies tend to show that juries are more inclined not to give
extraordinary weight to polygraph evidence."); James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reeval
uation - Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 375-77
(1996) ("[R]ecent studies suggest that jurors do not give polygraph results disproportionate
weight."); see also United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1533 & n.14 (11th Cir. 1989)
(en bane) (citing Stephen C. Carlson et al., The Effect of Lie Detector Evidence on Jury
Deliberations: An Empirical Study, 5 J. PoLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 148 (1977) for the proposition
that many studies refute contention that jurors give disproportionate weight to polygraph
evidence); Alan Markwart & Brian E. Lynch, The Effect of Polygraph Evidence on Mock
Jury Decision-Making, 7 J. POLICE Sex. & ADMIN. 324 (1979); Robert A. Peters, A Survey of
Polygraph Evidence in Criminal Trials, 68 AB.A. J. 162 (1982)). See generally 1 PAUL C.
GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMwINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 520 (2d ed. 1993) (arguing
that "the clear weight of the available hard data calls into question the assumption . . . that
scientific evidence overwhelms the typical lay juror").

Courage

August 1999]

2433

Yet one need not dismiss concerns about expert testimony as
mere judicial mistrust of the jury. Assume that jurors are in no way
overwhelmed or bamboozled by expert testimony - that they still
decide the case themselves. The jurors then may come to under
stand themselves as doing that and no more. If jurors understand
the question before them to be merely "whose experts do you be
lieve," they may be less likely to confront - to feel truly responsi
ble for - the act of judgment that follows from choosing to believe
the State's witnesses.110 If juries are to feel responsible for verdicts,
they must see themselves as participants rather than commentators.
Doing, not deciding, implicates the conscience. Even if expert testi
mony cannot usurp the jury's decisionmaking role, it may put at risk
the jury's responsibility-taking function by allowing jurors to under
stand themselves as merely deferring to authority. "Abdication"
might be a more accurate term than "usurpation," for the risk is not
in what the experts will take, but in what the jurors might too wil
lingly let go - the sense of personal responsibility for judgments.
I am not prepared to argue that expert testimony should be ex
cluded in order to make sure juries feel responsible for verdicts.
My particular claim regarding expert testimony is more modest, and
is explanatory rather than prescriptive. I merely suggest that recog
nizing the jury's responsibility-taking role may shed light on judicial
discomfort with the ever-increasing role of expert witnesses in the
courtroom.
D.

The Uncertain Status of Jury Nullification

Few matters related to the criminal trial jury have received as
much attention lately as the question of jury nullification.111 When,
110. Charles Nesson offers a related explanation for judicial resistance to statistical evi
dence. Nesson argues that effective deterrence depends upon verdicts that the public will
view "as statements about what [actually] happened," rather than as statements about the
evidence presented at trial. See Nesson, supra note 4, at 1367. Similarly, the jury's
responsibility-taking function demands that they not understand themselves as merely decid
ing which expert to believe.
111. A sample of recent law review literature focusing entirely or in part on nullification
would include: Darryl K. Brown, Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REv.
1149 {1997) (arguing that "in contrast with prevailing assumptions about nullification by both
its supporters and detractors, . . . nullification can, and in many contexts does, occur within
the rule of law rather than subvert it"); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black
Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE LJ. 677 {1995); David N. Dorfman & Chris
K. Iijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 861 {1995); James Joseph Duane, Jury Nullification: The Top Secret Constitutional
Right, LITIGATION, Summer 1996, at 6; David Farnham, Jury Nullification: History Proves It's
Not a New Idea, CRIM. Jusr., Wmter 1997, at 4; Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson,
Jury Nullification: A Callfor Justice or an Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 Mn.. L. REv. 133 n.16
(1993); Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to
Professor Butler, 44 U.C. Los ANGELES L. REv. 109 {1996) {arguing, among other things,
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ever, can or should juries refuse to convict despite the fact that

the law appears to warrant a conviction? The arguments on this
issue are contentious and energetic, and often conflate issues which
might helpfully be distinguished. As noted above, there is substan
tial uncertainty regarding the empirical question of how rare or fre
quent nullification actually is.112 Beyond that, there are debates
regarding the legal status of nullification. Is it a right?113 An extra
legal power?H4 An unlawful practice?115

These arguments are

often tied to underlying disputes over the desirability or normative
status of nullification. Do we call to mind the brave Massachusetts
jurors of a century and a half ago who refused to convict under the
fugitive slave laws? Or do we envision white Southern juries refus
ing to convict those guilty of lynching blacks?
Without intending to slight the complexity of these debates, my
aim here is neither to catalogue nor to adjudicate between them.
Instead, I focus on a particular puzzle which appears to underlie
arguments about the legal and normative status of nullification.
The puzzle is this. On one hand, courts work very hard to prevent
jurors from nullifying.

At the same time, however, courts are

equally energetic in preserving an array of procedural rules and
practices which seem calculated to preserve the jury's power to nul
lify. Recognizing the jury's responsibility-taking role helps recon
cile the apparent contradiction.
The key is that responsibility depends upon an awareness of
choice. If jurors did not have the power to acquit, they could not
and would feel a sense of responsibility for or agency in convictions.
The power to nullify thus plays a role which does not depend on an
argument that that power should ever be utilized. We hope that
juries will convict when convictions are warranted. The criminal
justice system depends upon their doing so. We hope that juries

will follow instructions, but we do not want for them to understand
themselves as "just following orders." If the jury is to perform the
that race-based jury nullification subverts the rule of law and will ultimately rebound to the
detriment of the very minority groups which appear to be short term beneficiaries); Andrew
D. Leipold, RethinkingJury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253 (1996); Alan W. Scheflin & Jon
M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience ofJury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
165, 175 (1991) (describing grass roots support for nullification and claiming that "[t]he jury
nullification movement is more active now than at any previous period"); Weinstein, supra
note 61, at 240 ("When juries refuse to convict on the basis of what they think are unjust
laws, they are performing their duty as jurors.").
112. See supra notes 59-61, and accompanying text.
113. See Duane, supra note 111, at 6.
114. See Butler, supra note 111; Dorfman & Iijima, supra note 111.
115. See Korroch & Davidson, supra note 111, at 133 n.16; Leipold, supra note 111.
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responsibility-taking role described above, jurors need to know that
they are being asked, rather than forced, to convict when the law so
warrants.
In order to highlight the potential incongruity, I again make the
simplifying assumption that nullification is generally undesirable. I
do not suggest that the issue is simply a binary question of "desira
ble" v. "undesirable." Much less do I intend to dismiss arguments
in favor of nullification.116 Rather, the assumption is warranted as
a matter of argument simply because courts continue to behave as if
nullification were a thing to be avoided. The courts have come
down firmly against efforts to describe nullification as a right rather
than a power.117 Similarly, courts have rejected efforts by defend
ants to have juries instructed as to their nullification power.118 The
116. In particular, I readily recognize that nullification is not without its supporters. On
the popular front, an energetic group based in rural Montana (but operating nationwide),
known as the Fully Informed Jury Association, goes so far as to hand out pamphlets to poten
tial jurors outside of courtrooms. The pamphlets advocate nullification and "inform" jurors
they "cannot be forced to obey a 'jurors oath.' " See Frederic B. Rogers, The Jury in Revolt?

A "Heads Up" on the Fully Informed Jury Association Coming Soon to a Courthouse in Your
Area, JUDGES J., Summer 1996, at 10, 11. Although the Fully Informed Jury Association
appears to be a fringe group, nullification has found support within the mainstream. See
Rogers, supra, at 10 ("[T]he Fully Informed Jury Association is led by its national coordina
tor, Don Doig, of Helmville [Montana], population 26. Its antecedents are in the radical anti
Semitic right and the writings of militia activist MJ. "Red" Beckman."); see also Erick J.
Haynie, Comment, Populism, Free Speech, and the Rule of Law: The "Fully Informed" Jury
Movement and Its Implications, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CruM!NoLOGY 343 (1997). For example,
former federal prosecutor and current law professor Paul Butler has argued that, in light of
the discriminatory and utterly ineffective manner in which drug laws are drafted and en
forced, black jurors would be justified in refusing to convict blacks accused of nonviolent
drug crimes. See Butler, supra note 111.
Less notorious, but no less thought provoking, are the arguments mounted by James
Duane. See Duane, supra note 111, at 6. Duane has argued that the Sixth Amendment, the
Double Jeopardy Clause, and a history of judicial deference to jury verdicts all suggest that
juries should be informed not only of their power to nullify, but also of their right to do so.
Duane is careful to disavow the straw man claim that juries should be encouraged to disre
gard the courts' instruction for whatever reason they choose. Instead, his claim is that juries
have a well-established and long-recognized right to acquit for the specific purpose of lenity
- to inject "a slack into the enforcement of the law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying
influence of current ethical conventions." Id. at 9 (quoting United States ex reL Mccann v.
Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942)); see also Brown, supra note 111; Farnham, supra
note 111.
117. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695, (1984) (describing nullification
as a "lawless decision"); United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing
jury nullification as "lawless"); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993)
(describing nullification as moments when juries "choose to .flex their muscles, ignoring both
law and evidence"); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing Sparf
v. U.S., 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895), which held that "[t]he principle . . . that it is the duty of the
jury to apply the law as declared by the court (notwithstanding the finality of an acquittal
inconsistent with the law, and the resulting 'pardoning power' of the jury) was firmly estab
lished by the Supreme Court").
118. See, e.g., Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1190 (holding that courts are to "instruct the jury on
the dimensions of their duty to the exclusion of jury nullification"); United States v. Krzyske,
836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988) (approving trial court's refusal to give nullification in-
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courts may be wrong, but for the time being they refuse to en
courage or applaud jury nullification.
This seems all well and good until one reflects upon the wide
array of ways in which the courts have made sure juries retain this
power (which they have no right to use and which they should not
be told about). For example, directed verdicts are prohibited in
criminal cases, regardless of the weight of the evidence.119 As a
consequence, appellate courts are not permitted to take judicial no
tice of facts, however undisputed, that are necessary to a convic
tion.120 Special verdicts as well are disfavored in criminal cases, out
of a concern that requiring juries to explain their verdicts will limit
their ability simply to acquit.121
struction and statement to jury that "valid jury nullification" does not exist); United States v.
Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105-06 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that jury instructions on nullification
would invite juries to disregard the law).
119. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516 n.5 (1979) (holding that the
Constitution bars directed verdicts against defendants in criminal cases regardless of strength
of State's evidence); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 n.5 (1976) (finding directed
verdict to be "totally alien to our notions of criminal justice [because] the discretionary act of
jury nullification would not be permitted").
120. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 20l(g); United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1978)
(holding appellate court was not permitted to take judicial notice of undisputed fact that
South Central Bell Telephone Company was "a co=on carrier . . . providing or operating
. . . facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign co=unications" (citations omit
ted)). This rule has been roundly and justifiably criticized on the grounds that it amounts to
the following claim: appellate courts should not take notice of any fact necessary to a convic
tion, however undisputed, because of the possibility that the jury, which decided not to ac
quit, might have acquitted if presented with the possibility of using a patently false finding e.g., that the telephone company is not a co=on carrier - as a hook for that acquittal,
despite the fact that, if the jury had decided to acquit, no explanation for nullification could
or would have been required. See 10 JAMES WM. MooRE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC
TICE § 201.70 (2d ed. 1996).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 168 F.3d 558, 562 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v.
Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979); see also
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.7a, at 1050 (2d ed.
1992) (noting that special verdicts in criminal cases are "not favored"); 3 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGIIT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCE
DURE § 512 n.5 (2d ed. 1982) ("The rule against special verdicts in criminal cases is nothing
more nor less than a recognition of the principle that 'the jury, as conscience of the co=u
nity, must be permitted to look at more than logic."' (citing United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d
165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969))); Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin ofLittle Minds? Our Foolish Law
of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARv. L. REv. 771, 835 (1998) ("Courts have resisted special
verdicts in criminal cases precisely because such verdicts would endanger the jury's capacity
to be merciful." (citing United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 927 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). For cases dealing with concerns regarding
special verdicts, see United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 416-18 (3d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Wilson, 629 F.2d 439, 443 (6th Cir. 1980); and Spock, 416 F.2d at 182. There are,
however, cases in which special verdicts in criminal cases are considered appropriate. See
United States v. Melvin, 27 F.3d 710, 716 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that trial court may use a
special verdict in certain entrapment cases). There are even cases in which such verdicts are
required. See FED. R. CRIM. PRoc. 31(e) for an example of requiring special verdicts in
certain criminal forfeiture cases.

Courage

August 1999]

2437

Why work so hard to protect a power if we do not want it to be
used? If jurors are obligated and expected to follow instructions,
why is their power to do otherwise considered so important? One
answer may lie in jury's responsibility-taking role. Without the pos
sibility of nullification, juror agency would be vitiated. Unless they
could refuse to convict, jurors will not feel responsible for convic
tions. On this reading, it is the possibility, rather than the event, of
nullification that matters. Nullification is a risk we must bear if we
want jurors to feel agency. When, therefore, courts protect the
jury's nullification power while at the same time refusing to endorse
nullification, it is not necessary to accuse them of hypocrisy or con
fusion. Nor is it necessary to accuse (or credit) the courts with en
couraging nullification. Recognizing the jury's responsibility-taking
function offers an explanation for why we might well desire to pro
tect a power even if we hope it is never used.
V.

ENGENDERING JURY REsPONSIBILITY

What follows? If courage of the sort I have described is worth
having, and the jury is in fact one institution through which this
form of courage might be displayed, what concrete aspects of jury
decisionmaking can contribute to the jury's ability to perform this
role? In this Part, I make four recommendations. Two will be rela
tively uncontroversial: first, juries ought to be as representative as
possible; second, criminal juries ought to be required to turn in
unanimous verdicts. My third recommendation will be less readily
embraced: juries ought to know what punishment will follow a con
viction. My final recommendation is more tentative and might be
difficult to apply without unduly risking the jury's decisionmaking
function: juries ought to be instructed in such a way as to impress
upon them their agency in bringing about the consequences of a
conviction.
A.

Jury Representativeness

The most straightforward implication of my claim is that juries
ought to be drawn from a true cross-section of the community.
Granted, one need not reimagine the jury in order to generate argu
ments on behalf of representativeness. For example, it has been
argued that making juries more representative will reduce bias, fa
cilitate deliberation, enhance the public acceptability of verdicts,
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and inject differing viewpoints into the criminal justice system.1 22
The United States Supreme Court has systematically invalidated
practices of exclusionary jury selection.123 In general, the history of
the criminal jury in America reveals an inexorable, if yet unfinM
ished, march towards inclusiveness.124

Recognizing the jury's

responsibility-taking function, however, does put an interesting
twist on the matter. While many arguments for jury representativeM
ness hinge on a desire to ensure that those at the margins of society
are not excluded, my concern here is that those in the mainstream
not be permitted to exclude themselves.
Throughout this article I refer to juries and jurors in the third
person, as I argue that "they" ought to feel responsibility for and
acknowledge agency in judgments made on behalf of the com
munity. I should emphasize, however, that they are us. I am not
advocating that jurors as some separate and identifiable subset of
the population are the appropriate people to take responsibility for
troubling judgments. Rather, my claim is that ideally all of us
would acknowledge that agency. This being impractical, we should
take turns. The jury is the institution through which we, as jurors,
acknowledge responsibility for what we, as members of the com
munity, find it necessary or appropriate to do. Accordingly, my
claim both depends upon and provides an argument for jury
representativeness.

If the jury is to function as an institution through which we take
turns acknowledging agency, rather than as a method of asking
some subset of the population to do so on our behalf, all those who
would seek to influence the content of the law ought to be willing as
well to accept responsibility for the consequences of the law. For
this reason, it seems appropriate that all registered voters should be
required to serve on criminal juries from time to time. I do not
122. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury That ls Both
Impartial and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 703 (1998); Andrew G. Deiss, Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Trial Jury in a Pluralist
America, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. RoUNDTABLE 323 (1996); Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race
Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairness ofJury Proceedings: An Em
pirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CruM. L. REv. 1177 (1994); Kenneth S. Klein, Unpacking the Jury Box,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1996); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System's
Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1377 (1994).
123. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (invalidating preemp
tory challenges based on gender); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (holding exclusion
ary practices in grand jury selection not remedied by subsequent fair trial untainted by racial
discrimination); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (invalidating racially discriminatory
jury selection practices); see also James H. Coleman, The Evolution ofRace in the Jury Selec
tion Process, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1105 (1996).
124. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 15.
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mean that jury service should be limited to registered voters. On
the contrary, all should serve. My claim is that those who would
fancy themselves lawmakers ought as well to take a tum as respon
sibility takers.

It will perhaps be objected that laws are most often made not by
the people directly, but by legislatures. As a result, one might ar
gue that those laws may or may not reflect the actual desires of the
people themselves. Perhaps it is unfair to ask us to take responsi
bility for what they have decided. Perhaps the people should be
asked to take direct responsibility for only those laws which they
have directly endorsed through referenda or initiatives.
To this I have two responses. First of all, it may be unwarranted
to claim that legislative decisions are less representative of popular

will than are direct democratic outcomes. As I have argued else
where, neither direct democracy nor representation is capable of
producing results unambiguously describable as the will of the peo
ple.125 More to the point, it should not matter what processes we as
a people have decided to employ in the construction of our criminal
law. It remains our law. The democratic project depends upon the
premise that rules generated through certain agreed-upon processes
are fairly attributable to the whole. We have agreed to call our own
those laws made by processes into which we are each given fair and
equal input. Each of us is required to follow laws we did not vote
for. Beyond that, each of us as jurors is asked to enforce laws we
did not vote for. It seems equally fair, and equally a consequence
of democratic politics, that we each be asked to accept responsibil
ity for those laws.
I embrace, however, the connection between democratic politics
and the jury's responsibility-taking role. On one view of the jury,
the institution is understood as protecting against the illegitimate
exercise of state force. Juries, on this reading, must serve as the
conscience of the community in order to protect defendants against
arbitrary and unwarranted prosecution. On my terms, however, the
jury's role as the passive, responsibility-taking conscience of the
community is equally important, and perhaps more fairly imposed
upon jurors, to the extent that the power being exercised is legiti
mate. The clearer it is that a law has the support of the people, the
fairer it is to ask the people to take responsibility for that law's
consequences.
125. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HAR.v. L. REv.
434 (1998).
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This does not mean that the jury's responsibility-taking function
should be modulated according to the perceived legitimacy of each
law. As I have argued, it is our law, like it or not. Rather, the
connection between legitimacy and responsibility suggests that each
should be maximized independently. Both our lawmaking and our
responsibility-taking institutions should be as broadly representa
tive as possible.
B.

The Unanimity Requirement

A juror is unlikely to feel truly responsible for a conviction un
less he or she understands that the verdict depends upon his or her
agreement. Put more strongly, no juror will feel truly responsible
for a criminal conviction if that juror feels that the defendant would
have been convicted with or without his or her concurrence. For
this reason, the jury's responsibility-taking function is best facili
tated by requiring that criminal trial juries return unanimous
verdicts.
American courts for the most part require unanimous verdicts
for criminal convictions. In

1972, the United States Supreme Court

held that unanimous verdicts are not constitutionally required and
that

10-2 or 9-3 verdicts would suffice to perform the essential func

tion of the criminal jury; but unanimity remains the overwhelming
norm.126 The unanimity requirement has been explained or de
fended on several grounds. Traditionally, it has been argued that
only by requiring unanimous verdicts can criminal trials adequately
protect defendants from the power of the state.127 Recently, theo
rists have emphasized the deliberative and representative functions
of the jury and argued that the requirement of unanimity forces
jurors to talk to one another and to take into consideration the
opinions and perspectives of the other jurors.12s
Justice Kennedy, concurring in

McKoy

v.

North Carolina, ex

pressed a combination of these concerns and connected them to the
idea of community conscience, when he noted that the unanimity
requirement "is an accepted, vital mechanism to ensure that real
126. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 {1972). To date, only Louisiana and Oregon
permit criminal convictions by less than unanimous verdicts.
127. See, e.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 353 {1898) {"The wise men who framed
the Constitution of the United States were of [the] opinion that life and liberty, when in
volved in criminal prosecutions, would not be adequately secured except through the unani
mous verdict of twelve jurors."), quoted in JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE TIIE JURY 179 {1994).
128. See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 127, at 191-96; REm HAsTIE ET AL., INsIDE TiiE
JURY 173-74 {1983).
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and full deliberation occurs in the jury room, and that the jury's
ultimate decision will reflect the conscience of the community."129
The McKay case involved the requirement of unanimity on the
part of juries making capital sentencing recommendations. In the
same context, the North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized
the role played by the unanimity requirement in preventing jurors
from avoiding their responsibility to make difficult decisions:
"[T]he jury unanimity requirement prevents the jury from evading
its duty to make a sentence recommendation. If jury unanimity is
not required, then a jury that was uncomfortable in deciding life
and death issues simply could 'agree to disagree' and escape its duty
to render a decision."13o In addition to forcing juries to make dif
ficult decisions in the context of sentencing recommendations,
where avoiding the decision entirely might seem possible, I suggest
that unanimity also plays a role in ensuring that each juror con
fronts his or her own "but-for" agency ·in that decision.
Take the easy case first. Imagine a scenario in which 10-2 would
suffice for a conviction, but the verdict is in fact unanimous or 11-1.
In such a case, each convicting juror would reasonably believe that
his or her vote was not in fact necessary for the conviction. Each
juror might believe that the defendant would have been convicted
with or without that j�or's vote. Granted, some jurors might be
mistaken in this belief. For example, an influential juror's willing
ness to convict might sway others, in which case that juror might
well have been a but-for cause of the conviction. Nonetheless, it is
easy to see how jurors on a jury with "extra" votes for conviction
might be able to ease their own sense of agency in the verdict.
But what about verdicts that come in "on the number," with
precisely the ten votes needed for conviction? In those cases, it
might seem that at least the convicting jurors would feel agency would know that the verdict did in fact depend upon their concur
rence. Maybe. It is entirely possible, however, that even the juror
casting the critical tenth vote would be able to escape acknowledg
ing agency in the verdict. For a convicting juror to feel full respon
sibility for the conviction, he or she would need to be convinced
that neither of the two holdouts could have ever been persuaded to
vote for a conviction. The tenth juror, indeed each convicting juror,
might well believe that one of the holdouts would have given in
eventually. If so, he or she would understand his concurrence not
129. 494 U.S. 433, 452 (1990).
130. State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25, 39 (N.C. 1995).
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as a but-for cause of the conviction, but merely as a concession to
the inevitable.
Indeed, that tenth juror would probably be right. Research sug
gests that nine out of ten verdicts, even where unanimity is re
quired, eventually go the way of the initial poll.131 Holdouts
eventually go along with the majority. It is not clear whether this is
a consequence of reasoned deliberation, as one might hope, or a
result of pure exhaustion or pressure. It remains the case, however,
that a juror casting the tenth and deciding vote in a

10�2

regime

would have every reason to expect that if he or she did not give in,
someone else would. Accordingly, only unanimity can ensure a
sense of agency.
Agency is an individual, rather than a group, experience. The
Supreme Court of California called attention to this reality in the
context of reviewing jury instructions which, like those described
above, asked the jury to serve as the conscience of the community.
The court noted that "[t]o the extent that the proposed instructions
intimate that the jury must reach such decision in accordance with
the community conscience, they are incorrect. The verdict must ex
press the individual conscience of each juror. "132
Conscience is like that. While it reflects and emerges from col
lective identity, it works only upon the individual - the mob hav
ing, as the saying goes, none at all. For juries to take responsibility
on the community's behalf, jurors, as individuals, must do so. And
for any juror to feel truly responsible for a verdict, he or she needs
to understand that he or she could have hung the thing.
C.

Punishment

Juries cannot take responsibility, on the community's behalf, for
what we as a community are required to do, unless they know what
we are doing. If the jury is to be the forum in which each of us
takes a turn confronting and acknowledging agency in troubling
judgments, jurors must understand what those judgments are. I
have argued above that for juries to serve their responsibility-taking
function, they must understand themselves as participants rather
131. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 4, at 488 ("[W]here there is an initial majority
either for conviction or for acquittal, the jury in roughly nine out of ten cases decides in the
direction of the initial majority."); see also JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE AMERICAN JURY 286-87 (1987); MICHAEL J. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF
GROUP SIZE AND SoCIAL DECISION RULE 94 (1977); cf. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 128, at 99106 & 103 tbl. 6.2.
132. People v. Harrison, 381 P.2d 665, 671 (Cal. 1963) (noting further that "[y]our verdict
must express the individual opinion of each juror" (quoting trial court's jury instructions)).
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than as commentators. While the jury's primary role is to figure out
what happened, jurors cannot, if they are to feel agency in the judg
ment, understand themselves as doing that and nothing more. They
must recognize as well that they are determining what will happen
next. Juries should know what will happen to a defendant if they
convict. Juries should be instructed as to what punishment, or what
possible range of punishments, will be imposed in the event of a
conviction.
This argument, I recognize, runs counter to current doctrine. In
cases in which juries play no role in sentencing, jurors are generally
not informed as to what punishment will likely attend a convic
tion.133 The rationale for this practice was neatly captured by the
United States Supreme Court, in Shannon v. United States, in which
the Court observed that "providing jurors sentencing information
invites them to ponder matters not within their province, distracts
them from their factfinding responsibilities, and creates a strong
possibility of confusion."134 As the Court recognized, "[t]he princi
ple that juries are not to consider the consequences of their verdicts
is a reflection of the basic division of labor in our legal system be
tween judge and jury."135 In most categories of noncapital cases,
juries convict and judges sentence.

The Court elaborated as

follows:
The jury's function is to find the facts and to decide whether, on those
facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The judge, by con
trast, imposes sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived at
a guilty verdict. Information regarding the consequences of a verdict
is therefore irrelevant to the jury's task.136

The operating assumption here is that factfinding is the jury's
sole function. In this light, information regarding sentencing does
133. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994); see also United States v.
Richardson, 130 F.3d 765, 778 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Curry contends that, given his culpability and
the severity of the sentence he was facing, he should have been allowed to tell the jury of his
possible punishment during closing argument. Unfortunately for him, arguing punishment to
a jury is taboo . . . ."), revd. on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 1707 (1999); United States v. Lewis,
110 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir.) ("In [defendant's] trial, the jury had no sentencing function, and
no statute required that the jury be informed of the consequences of the verdict. The district
court correctly refused to allow [the defendant] to argue about his potential punishment."),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 854 (1997). Juries are, of course permitted to consider punishment
when, as in capital cases, sentencing is part of the jury's doctrinal function. See, e.g.,
Mahaffey v. Page, 151 F.3d 671, 684 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel and noting that "Mahaffey's counsel presented a coherent closing argument to the
jury . . . . [He] discussed the nature of punishment and argued that the jury should act
mercifully and not be responsible for an individual's death"), revd. in part on other grounds,
162 F.3d 481 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1786 (1999).
134. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579.
135. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579.
136. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579.

2444

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:2381

appear "irrelevant to the jury's task."137 H, however, the jury is not
merely making decisions but is also being asked to take responsibil
ity for those decisions, sentencing information emerges as not only
relevant but essential. Juries cannot take responsibility for what
they do if they do not know what they are doing.
Given that a refusal to provide juries with sentencing informa
tion is a consequence or manifestation of the judicial division of
labor, through which juries convict and judges sentence, it is worth
looking more closely at that division. It appears that the bifurcation
of criminal trials in this way is itself partially explainable as a re
sponse to the very perplexity of judgment that I am arguing we as a
community ought to confront. As Thomas Green has observed, this
"phenomenon of bifurcation is a central feature of the approach we
take to the criminal law, one of those developments that tell us a
great deal about who we are, or what we seek to be. "138 On
Green's reading, this long-standing split between conviction and
sentencing was deepened and entrenched during the Progressive
Era in response to our deep uncertainty regarding free will. At
trial, the jury would determine guilt or innocence according to
traditional, generally accepted notions of personal responsibility.
At the sentencing phase, however, judges were to consider more
individualized, explanatory, or mitigating factors such as the "de
fendant's background, upbringing, associates, and so on - matters
rarely formally admissible during the trial . . . . "139
In this way the bifurcation of the trial process allows us, so long
as we do not examine the matter too closely, to understand our
selves as both a community that believes in holding people respon
sible for their actions and a progressive community that recognizes
and appreciates the influences of upbringing, environment, and sim
ilar individualized considerations, on human behavior. Unfortu
nately, this s ame bifurcation, depending upon how it is
implemented, might say something else about us as well - some
thing substantially less flattering "about who we are, or what we
seek to be."140 Ironically, a method developed in part to help us
deal fairly with the problem of judgment is now employed to help
us avoid confronting that problem.
Consider the concrete circumstances under which defendants
might most want juries to have sentencing information. The dif137.
138.
139.
140.

Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579.
Green, supra note 37, at 1923.
See id. at 1923-25.
Id. at 1923.
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ficulty arises when the punishment a defendant will receive if con
victed is substantially more harsh than the jury might reasonably
expect. The paradigmatic cases arise under "three strikes" statutes,
which mandate dramatically increased sentences for defendants
with prior felony convictions. In such cases, it is feared that juries
will refuse to convict if informed of the extended sentence that will
accompany conviction for what may seem to the jury a relatively
minor offense.141
In these contexts, talk about juries being "confused" appears
somewhat misleading, if not disingenuous. Jurors asked to sentence
a person to life in prison for holding an ounce of marijuana would
not be confused - they would be unwilling. They would be under
standably hesitant to look a man or woman in the eye and take
responsibility for imposing what appears to be a disproportionate
punishment. Seen in its best light, concealing from jurors the con
sequences of their decisions might be described as a precom
mitment strategy - a way of protecting against the possibility that
people will shrink from a difficult task. But what a cowardly strat
egy it is. In order to ensure that we do not blink when called upon
to do a difficult task, we contrive to do the job with our eyes closed
entirely.
The problem is not juror confusion but community cowardice.
Administering a troubling three-strikes statute through the medium
of blinkered juries represents an ignoble, if cleverly designed,
method of assigning responsibility without anyone ever having to
take responsibility for that assignment.142 If we as a community
truly feel it is appropriate to sentence a person to life in prison for
any third felony conviction, we should be willing to look that person
in the eye and say so. What we should not do is assign this difficult
and perplexing task to those who know not what they do.
141. An interesting variation on this theme occurs when the punishment a defendant will
receive is less than what the jury might expect. In State v. Short, 618 A.2d 316, 321-23 (NJ.
1993), a murder case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the jury should not have
been informed that if the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of man
slaughter, he would be acquitted because the statute of limitations had run as to that offense.
The court reasoned that, given that information, the jury might bring in a murder conviction
even if they felt that only manslaughter was warranted.
142. Paul Robinson has argued that three-strikes statutes, as well as other similar sen
tencing policies, are not really about assigning responsibility, but in fact methods of achieving
incapacitation - responses not to individual desert but to perceived future dangerousness.
Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice (unpublished manuscript). Assuming Robinson is correct, my argument remains.
Whatever we hope to accomplish through the imposition of criminal sentences, we ought to
be able to acknowledge our own agency in imposing those sentences.
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A "Responsibility Instruction"

As I have argued above in attempting to look at the ongoing
debate over jury nullification through the lens provided by the no
tions of responsibility-taking and decisionmaking, coercion subverts
agency. If juries are to stand in for the community in taking respon
sibility for convictions, they should not feel that they are being co
erced. Juries ought to understand that they are being asked, rather
than required, to perform a difficult and important task. We as a
community want juries to convict when the evidence warrants; we
need for them to do so. But if juries are to feel responsible for
convictions, they need to understand that they have the power not
to convict. We need for juries to follow instructions, but we ought
to hope as well that they do not understand themselves as "just
following orders."
This does not mean that jury instructions should advocate or
even suggest nullification. Nor do I argue that juries have a right to
nullify. I

am

not talking about rights, but about obligations and

agency. Consider the following possible jury instruction:
Ladies and gentlemen, you are called upon to perform a difficult
and important job. First of all, you are being asked to decide whether
the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
did in fact commit the crime for which he is charged. If you deter
mine that the State has not met this burden, you are to acquit the
defendant and set him free. If you decide that the State has in fact
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed this
crime, your responsibility is to convict.

In performing this difficult and important job, each of you should
understand that the responsibility for this decision is entirely yours
and that you will not be required to explain or justify your verdict
except to your own conscience. If you acquit this defendant, he will
go free today. If you convict, I will sentence him to
[as required
by federal law] or
[depending upon my analysis of mitigating
factors]. I am aware that this is a terrible burden that you are asked
to bear on behalf of your community. But our system depends upon
each of us taking a tum, serving on juries, and bearing that burden as
honestly, fairly, and bravely as we can.
__

__

It seems to me that such an instruction might fix responsibility with
out unduly encouraging nullification.
As I have acknowledged, measures that serve to increase jurors'
sense of responsibility present the risk that we might put too much
weight on the shoulders of the jury. By continuing to require una
nimity from criminal trial juries, by making juries aware of the pun
ishment that will accompany a conviction, and by making sure they
understand that no one will question them if they acquit, we in-
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crease the chance that juries will simply refuse to convict - that
they will nullify. Perhaps a responsibility instruction would increase
this risk unacceptably. Jurors made too vividly aware of their own
agency and responsibility might lack the courage to convict. In the
end, we cannot hope to express more courage than we have - to
describe ourselves as braver than we are.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Plato argued that responsibility for the conviction of criminals,
and for the resolution of at least some civil suits, ought to rest with
laymen rather than with professional judges:

In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to par
ticipate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may
reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the deci
sion. . . . And in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have
a share; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt
to imagine that he has no share in the state at all.143
To this I would add that when the State judges a wrongdoer, all
judge and might reasonably be asked to acknowledge responsibility
for that judgment, for he who feels no responsibility' for the admin
istration of justice is apt to feel that he has no responsibility for the
State at all.
I cannot prove that if we allow ourselves to become a cowardly
society we will slip into cruelty. Much less do I claim that accepting
agency in assignments of blame is the best or only way to display
courage. I simply suggest that we might want to be the kind of
people who do not always hide from our tragic choices and that
juries, conceived of as institutions through which we each take turns
confronting the perplexity of judgment, offer one way of owning up
to what we find necessary to do.

143. PLATO, Laws IV 16S, in 2 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 529 (B. Jowett trans., Random
House rev. ed. 1937).

